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POWER, POLITICS, AND THE ORIGIN OF THE CHINESE EXCLUSION ERA 
 
 
 This study places the origins of the Chinese Exclusion Era (1823-1882) in a larger 
regional, national, and international context to reveal that the Chinese Exclusion Era was not a 
direct cause and effect relationship between labor and policy, but rather a negotiation between 
various groups including immigrants, laborers, politicians, and businessmen, where each group 
worked in its own self-interest to achieve or eliminate the exclusion of Chinese immigrants  in the 
United States. This study focuses on issues of race, class, and gender, with particular emphasis 
on the ways in which existing structures and institutions within the United States such as the 
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"Give me your tired, your poor, Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, The 
wretched refuse of your teeming shore. Send these, the homeless, temptest-tost to me, I lift my 
lamp beside the golden door!" - The New Colossus by Emma Lazarus 
 
In 1883 Emma Lazarus published The New Colossus to raise money for the pedestal of 
the Statue of Liberty so that she might welcome immigrants into the United States where they 
would enjoy life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Just one year before Lazarus published 
The New Colossus, 200 miles away the United States Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion 
Act of 1882, which for the first time in the history of the United States banned a group of people 
from immigrating based on their race. Dedicating the Statue of Liberty on October 28, 1886, 
President Grover Cleveland promised “We will not forget that Liberty has here made her home; 
nor shall her chosen altar be neglected.”1 If anybody at the dedication ceremony recognized the 
irony of the President’s words juxtaposed against the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, there is no 
record.  
The 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act was a radical departure from previous federal 
legislation on immigration. In 1864, the United States Congress passed “An act to encourage 
immigration,” throwing the golden doors wide open to all who cared to walk through them. Less 
than twenty years later, the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act slammed the doors shut for a specific 
group of people: Chinese immigrants. The United States had officially transitioned into a 
gatekeeping nation.2 How can historians explain such a radical transformation of immigration 
policy?  
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Traditionally, historians have identified various aspects of labor unrest and ethnic tension 
on the West Coast as the driving force behind the shift in federal policy from encouraging 
immigration in 1864 to restricting immigration in 1882. In 1909 Mary Coolidge argued that the 
combined force of California workers and labor unions were responsible for the Chinese 
Exclusion Act.3 By the 1970s and 1980s the story remained largely the same. Historians like 
Alexander Saxton continued to focus on the role of labor unions to understand the causes behind 
exclusion.4 This explanation fails to consider the roles of structural racism, which we define here 
as prejudice, discrimination, or antagonism against someone of a different race, as central to the 
exclusion of Chinese immigrants. Indeed, economic conflict is only part of a story that goes 
much deeper. In the 1990s historians of Chinese Exclusion like Erika Lee began to put greater 
focus on the relationship between race and exclusion to reveal the complexity of the ethnic 
conflicts that led to exclusion legislation. Despite the turn to social history that places greater 
emphasis on race and ethnicity, these works continued to focus on the relationship between 
immigrants and laborers and ignore the larger regional, national, and international context that 
contributed to the exclusion of Chinese immigrants from the United States.  
This exploration picks up where historians of the Chinese Exclusion Era have left off, by 
placing the Chinese Exclusion Era within the larger context of the 1850s West, the 1880 national 
political race, and international relations with China. The first chapter explores the movement of 
racist ideologies from the East Coast of the United States to the West Coast, were Anglo-
Americans established hegemony (dominance of one social group over another) over minorities 
based on the idea that Anglo-Americans were racially superior to people of color through the 
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creation of discriminatory legislation. The second chapter shifts our focus slightly to emphasize 
the role of national politics in making the Chinese question a national issue. Indeed, the cries for 
exclusion by laborers in California were ignored by politicians on the East Coast until the 
Election of 1880, when the race between Democrats and Republicans for President came down 
to a handful of electoral votes that suddenly placed the concerns of Californians in the national 
spotlight. The final chapter examines the struggles between businessmen and laborers in Chinese 
Exclusion first in a regional and then national context. While historians of labor history have 
focused on the role of labor in agitating for Chinese Exclusion, these explorations have silenced 
the story of businessman and religious leaders who used their access to political power to reduce 
the severity of anti-immigration legislation.  
Together, these chapters complicate the direct cause and effect relationship that historians 
have traditionally drawn between labor and policy. Rather than an example of democracy at 
work, the Chinese Exclusion Era was a product of the cultural, political, and economic self-
interests of Anglo-Americans.5 Anglo-Americans sought to establish and maintain a social order 
in California that privileged white men. Politicians sought to gain national office. The President 
sought to maintain good relations with China. Businessmen sought to exploit cheap Chinese 
labor. Laborers sought to maintain high wages and working conditions. These groups had a 
direct, if often competing, interest in the Chinese question, and these groups sought to make their 
vision of immigration a reality through their access to power.   
Estimates of Chinese immigration to the United States between 1850 and 1900 vary 
amongst historians. There are two difficulties facing those who would accurately assess the 
number of Chinese immigrants to the United States during this period. The first difficulty is that 
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prior to 1875, immigration was largely unregulated at both the state and federal level. There was 
simply no system of tracking immigrants into the United States. Henderson v. Mayor of the City 
of New York (1875) would place immigration in the preview of the federal government, at which 
time federal immigration commissioners appointed by the federal government began to track 
immigration. This leaves over a 30 period where we have no records of Chinese (or any other) 
immigrants to the United States. Further, while the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act barred the 
immigration of Chinese laborers, Chinese immigrants already in the United States 
circumnavigated exclusion through a system of paper sons and daughters. Those who did not 
have relatives already in the United States could immigrate illegally to the United States via 
Canada and Mexico. With these difficulties in mind, conservative estimates of Chinese 
immigration to the United States between 1850 and 1900 place Chinese immigration at 400,000 
while more liberal estimates place Chinese immigration somewhere around 600,000. Regardless 
of whether we chose the conservative or the liberal estimate, we know that by 1900 Chinese 
immigrants constituted a significant portion (20%-40%) of the population in California.6  
Further, historians of Chinese immigration in the West have often been frustrated by the 
lack of written sources regarding the Chinese experience. There are no existing diaries 
(translated or in their original form) of the Chinese laborers who made up most initial 
immigrants from China. Historians have resorted to less direct means of assessing the Chinese 
experience, such as newspapers, travel journals, immigration records, census data, and 
comparison. This study is no exception. Chinese voices have been incorporated primarily 
through their testimony to special investigative committees and through the few diaries of 
Chinese immigrants to the United States that have been translated and digitized. Despite this 
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effort, the voices of Chinese immigrants are largely absent across this study. This is an 
unintentional reflection of not their silence during the Chinese Exclusion Era but rather their 
relative lack of access to power. 
This also study speaks in large ways to current debates surrounding immigration to the 
United States. Questions about the status and rights of immigrants swirl around questions about 
safety and border security. Without protected rights, with a status in flux, without access to 
power to influence policymakers, immigrants then and now are a group at risk for discrimination 
and exploitation. Then and now, various groups including Democrats and Republicans, 
businessman and laborers, registered voters and documented immigrants use the immigration 
question and immigrants to further their own ends. This study seeks to illuminate the historical 
roots of our current immigrant crisis in the hopes that we might change the story this time 





CHAPTER ONE: ANGLO-AMERICAN HEGEMONY IN CALIFORNIA 
“It is a hodge-podge of cities, a tower of Babel of all nationalities. You can hear all the languages on earth 
in its streets: Chinese, Norwegian, Russian, and Polynesian. You can see the garb of all the nationalities... 
There are Chinese with belted black pantaloons and blue blouses, with pigtails down to their knees; a 
Mexican with his sarape or blanket; the Chilean in his poncho; a Parisian in his smock; an Irishman with 
torn coat and crushed felt hat; and the Yankee, lord of all, in his red flannel shirt, heavy boots, and trousers 
belted at the waist.” Benjamin Vicuna Mackenna, 18521 
 
“Those who poured through St. Louis in the early 1800s could not so easily abandon their past, 
and neither could Jefferson’s nation. Trends that played themselves out west of the Mississippi 
grew from three hundred years’ experience in the east.” Daniel Richter2 
 
In 1933 labor organizer Rose Pesotta travelled on behalf of the International Ladies’ 
Garment Workers’ Union to San Francisco to organize female dressmakers in that city. Her 
efforts were hindered, however, by concerns about the loss of business to dressmakers in 
Chinatown.3 Seeking more information about Chinese dressmakers, Pesotta explored sweatshops 
in Chinatown accompanied by the chief field adjuster for the National Recovery Administration 
Leland Lazarus. Workers refused to speak to the “government official”, claiming an ignorance of 
English.4 Desiring more information, with the help of Chih Ling, Pesotta organized an informal 
meeting with two female garment workers. Speaking in Chinese, Ling eagerly told the garment 
workers about Pesotta and the ILGWU. After Ling was finished one of the garment workers, 
Hilda, kindly and carefully explained to Pesotta that they could not join the ILGWU. Pesotta 
protested, offering solutions to Hilda’s concerns about losing her job or being cast out by her 
family. After some back and forth Hilda, exasperated, asked Pesotta how long she had been in 
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San Francisco. Pesotta responded that she had only been in San Francisco a few months. “Then 
you don’t know our history on the Pacific Coast,” Hilda replied.5 
The history that Hilda referred to began long before Chinese immigrants arrived, in the 
Mexican-American War of 1832. The Mexican-American War seeded the West for the black-
white binary that Anglo-American immigrants brought with them during the California Gold 
Rush in the 1850s, which was critical for the establishment of Anglo-American hegemony on the 
West Coast. The idea of hegemony, or one the dominance of one social group over others, was 
first introduced by Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci suggested that hegemony is 
achieved through a combination of ideological means, where the subordinate group gives 
consent to the dominant group, and political means, where the state coerces the subordinate 
group. Hegemony requires the creation and maintenance of strong boundaries that differentiate 
the normal from the abnormal. 
This chapter will explore the cultural beliefs and ideologies that Anglo-Americans 
employed to establish hegemony in the West. Rather than constructing ideologies anew, Anglo-
American emigrants carried social and cultural norms with them to the West. The most important 
of these ideologies was the black-white binary.6 Developed in the milieu of slavery, the black-
white binary defines the norm as the white, Anglo Saxon, protestant (WASP) body and the 
abnormal as the black body. Unlike most Western European immigrants, African Americans and 
other immigrants that did not, or could not, conform to the Anglo-American norm (such as 
Chinese immigrants) were racialized as black. Thus, Chinese immigrants were often compared to 
and treated as African Americans. Both groups were categorized as disabled, intellectually and in 
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body. As we will see, anti-Chinese discourse was unique, however, in that Chinese immigrants 
were also gendered as feminine. Racialized as black, categorized as disabled, gendered as 
feminine, anti-Chinese discourse served to construe Chinese immigrants as ‘other’, and unfit for 
immigration to the United States. 
Anglo-Americans relied on democratic institutions to establish hegemony. As soon as 
California entered the Union in 1850, Anglo-Americans formed most political leaders and from a 
position of power began institutionalizing hegemony in policy. Anglo-American politicians in 
California passed a series of legislation that discriminated against foreign miners, with focus on 
Latin American miners. Indeed, we cannot understand the history of Chinese Exclusion Era 
without exploring the history of other groups excluded in California. This legislation, coupled 
with episodes of violence, drove most Latin Americans and Californios out of California. 
Politicians employed strikingly similar legislation to exclude Chinese immigrants after 1852 in a 
continued effort to establish and ensure hegemony. Without the ability to participate in the 
institution of democracy or access to policymakers, both Latin American and Chinese 
immigrants remained a vulnerable group subject to discrimination by Anglo-Americans. 
James W. Marshall discovered gold at Sutter’s Mill in early 1848, two weeks after the 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo had transferred ownership of California to the United States.7 
Though Marshall and Sutter tried to keep the discovery of gold a secret, news of a gold strike 
spread quickly spread across the world, bringing 300,000 fortune seekers to California gold 
camps between 1849 and 1850. Most 49ers came from the Eastern United States via the 
California Trail. Originating in Independence, Missouri, the 3,000-mile trail took emigrants 
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North through Fort Laramie in Wyoming, Fort Hall in Idaho, and finally to Sutter’s Fort in 
California.8  
Anglo-American emigrants who travelled from the East to West to make their fortunes in 
the California gold mines did not travel as tabla rasas, but rather with ideas, cultural practices, 
and social institutions that would come to form the foundations of exclusion. These ideas and 
cultural practices formed the foundation of Anglo-American hegemony that would result in the 
exclusion of Chinese immigrant laborers in 1882.   
BLACK-WHITE BINARY AND WASP 
21st century scholars largely agree that race is a social construct that varies across time 
and space. That is to say, who is considered white, who is considered brown, and who is 
considered black is highly contextual. Historically, race in the United States has served to 
maintain social order by creating a clear dominant group and a clear subordinate group. Omi and 
Winant and others agree that in the United States race has been sharply defined along a black-
white color line (what I refer to as the black-white binary), where the dominant group is 
considered normal and the subordinate group is considered abnormal or inferior.  
By the 19th century normal in the United States was defined as the WASP, or the white, 
Anglo-Saxon, Protestant body. Eric Kauffman traces WASP Ascendency between 1776 and 
1900 in The Rise and Fall of Anglo America.9 According to Kauffman the dominance of the 
WASP originated in the colonial period with English protestant settlers who were able to 
maintain ethnic dominance through a process of Anglo-conformity whereby new ethnic groups 
were encouraged to conform to the dominant group. 
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WASPs formed their identity against subordinate groups, most notably African American 
slaves. Historian Kariann Yokota argues that the formation of a racialized other in the United 
States was an attempt by Americans to create a post-Revolution identity and “address their 
relative powerlessness within the transatlantic context through various strategies of internal 
domination.”10 Edward Baptist notes the threat to the racial hierarchy posed by poor whites, and 
the ways in which slaveholders placed poor whites in positions of power and developed a 
discourse that valorized whiteness above blackness to preserve the social order.11 Whatever the 
cause, by the 1850s this black-white binary was fully entrenched in the Eastern half of the United 
States via the institution of slavery.  
This black-white binary travelled West even before the Gold Rush. In 1821, Mexico 
declared and won its independence from Spain, laying claim to a large swath of territory that 
included what would become California, Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, and Colorado. 
Because there were not enough Mexicans to occupy the new territory, in 1824 Mexico passed a 
colonization law that allowed Americans settlers into Texas. By 1834, Americans outnumbered 
Mexicans in Texas four to one.12 As historian David Weber points out, animosity between 
Mexicans and Americans were rooted in historical animosity between Spain and England and the 
Black Legend, which characterized Spanish as “authoritarian, corrupt…bigoted, cruel, greedy, 
tyrannical, fanatical, treacherous, and lazy”.13 As a result of the Black Legend, Americans 
perceived themselves to be superior to Spanish and after the Mexican-American War, Mexicans 
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and therefore, American conquest of Mexico was a justified effort to redeem degenerate 
Mexicans.14  
 Thus, the Mexican-American War of 1848 was not simply a war over the right to land, 
but rather a war centered on ideas of cultural superiority and Manifest Destiny. As culturally 
superior, Americans were destined to defeat Mexico and lay claim to the entirety of North 
America. That Americans prevailed in the Mexican-American War only solidified the belief in 
the superiority of the Anglo-American race.  
Though the immigration of freedmen (usually taken to mean an ex-slave, emancipated 
after the Civil War) never reached significant numbers, legislation systematically established the 
black-white binary in California to discourage the immigration of African Americans to the state. 
In 1850 California passed testimony laws that prohibited Native Americans and African 
Americans from testifying in courts against Anglo-Americans, and later that year a law that 
prohibited the miscegenation between African Americans and whites. In 1851, African 
Americans were prohibited from homesteading and African American children were prohibited 
from attending public schools. In 1852 California adopted a version of the fugitive slave law that 
mandated the return of escaped slaves to their owners.15   
The black-white binary travelled West with gold seekers. In California’s Anti-Chinese 
Memorial to Congress, the California legislature wrote that “even the position of the small 
number of free Negroes in the free States teaches us that no republican government ought to 
suffer the presence of a race which must, politically and socially, be always separate and 
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distinct.”16 For slaves and eventually  free blacks who travelled West to escape racial 
discrimination and threats of slavery, California offered no safe haven. 
This type of legislation passed through the California Congress quickly and with little 
protest as Anglo-Americans used their political monopoly to establish a social hierarchy long 
familiar to America. Najia-Aarim Heriot, a historian of ethnic and racial minorities in the United 
States, suggests that “the drive to exclude blacks originated in the desire to actualize an 
exceptional region -  not only ‘free’ but also all-white or nearly so.”17 While in the South anti-
black legislation served to maintain the social order, anti-black legislation in California and the 
West served to establish a social order.  
 Immigration challenged the black-white binary. Where did Eastern Europeans fit along 
this binary?  Mexican-Americans (many of whom were granted American citizenship by the 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848)? Chinese immigrants? The 19th century United States was 
constantly in process of what Omi and Winant define as ‘racialization’, or the process of placing 
undefined groups along the existing social hierarchy. While white groups like Eastern Europeans 
were eventually elevated to whiteness, groups like Mexicans and Chinese were racialized as 
black.  
Many Californians believed that Chinese labor, just like African American labor was 
‘unfree’ labor. In response to labor shortages caused by the Slave Emancipation Act passed by 
Great Britain in 1833, territories of European empires began importing Chinese coolie contract 
laborers in conditions that closely resembled slavery.18 American merchants in the coolie trade 
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earned $11 million dollars in ticket fees per year before the practice of transporting coolies was 
outlawed in the United States in 1862.19 While the Chinese who immigrated to California in the 
1850s were free laborers, the legacy of American merchants transporting coolies caused 
Californians suspicious of being undercut by cheap labor to accuse all immigrants of coolism. 
California was meant for the free, not the enslaved.  
Further, like African Americans but unlike European immigrants, Chinese immigrants 
could not hope to conform to the normal, or the WASP. Asian, not Anglo-Saxon. Confucian, not 
Christian or Protestant. If Chinese immigrants were not white, they had to be black, according to 
Californians.  
We can see the racialization of Chinese immigrants as black in contemporary accounts 
that likened Chinese to African Americans. In Governor Haight’s 1877 Inaugural Address, he 
suggested that “if the negro requires the ballot to protect himself…the Asiatic needs it to protect 
himself…on the contrary, it is for the good of both races that the elective franchise should be 
confined to the whites.”20 He went on to comment that “races so radically dissimilar in physical, 
mental, and moral constitution, as the Caucasian and African, or Mongolian” should not be 
encouraged to immigrate to California.21 Governor Henry Haight likened Chinese immigrants to 
African American migrants in citizenship status, physical, mental, and moral constitution. In 
every instance, African American migrants and Chinese immigrants are compared against the 
WASP.  
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The 1879 cover of Harper’s Weekly demonstrates the ways in 
which racialization of Chinese as black was incorporated into the 
national discussion.22 The cover is split into half. On the left side, a 
freed African American. On the right, a Chinese immigrant. Each is 
reacting to their respective hostile environments (South and West 
respectively) by abandoning their environments. Their fates 
intertwined, shaping and shaped by one another. National opinions of 
the Chinese were comparable to California opinions by 1879. 
ANGLO-CONFORMITY 
The racialization of Chinese as black impeded the assimilation of Chinese immigrants 
into American society. In 1964 Milton Gordon argued that in the United States, non-dominant 
ethnic groups have historically assimilated by adopting characteristics of the dominant (Anglo-
Saxon) ethnic group. He called this process Anglo-conformity. As Kaufmann noted, Anglo-
conformity is rooted in the Colonial Era when Germans, Welsh, Huguenot, and Scottish 
immigrants completely assimilated into the already dominant Anglo-Saxon culture, 
indistinguishable as individual groups by the early 1800s.23 In Stamped from the Beginning, 
Ibram Kendi points out that the conversation surrounding racism in the United States has been 
characterized by three sides – segregationists who blame minorities for their racial disparities, 
antiracists who blame racial discrimination for disparity, and assimilationists who blame both 
minorities and racial discrimination. Assimilationists in the United States have historically 
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argued that the best solution to address racial disparity is for the minority group to adopt the 
characteristics of the dominate group.24  
For a variety of reasons Chinese immigrants in California did not assimilate to the 
dominant culture like many of their European predecessors. An 1878 California report on 
Chinese immigration noted that “there is, indeed no point of contact between the Chinese and our 
people through which we can Americanize them [Chinese immigrants]”.25 The report was correct 
in that there were very few points of contact through which the Chinese may have engaged in the 
process of Anglo-conformity. After several episodes of racial violence in the mines, Chinese 
immigrants moved to diggings abandoned by Anglo-Americans, and eventually into occupations 
in which Anglo-Americans did not engage (like laundries). Because most Chinese were male 
(due to the federal 1875 Page Law that restricted female immigrants on suspicion of 
prostitution)26 and single, they had no children to send to school, traditionally one of the main 
vehicles for assimilation. Further, legislation discouraged the assimilation of Chinese 
immigrants. Indeed, while African Americans and Californios were (grudgingly) admitted to 
citizenship under federal direction, there was no such federal law that required states to permit 
Chinese immigrants to become citizens. Naturalization laws in California actually prohibited 
Chinese immigrants from citizenship. The 1879 California Constitution allowed “foreigners of 
the white race or of African descent…shall have the same rights in respect to the acquisition, 
possession, enjoyment, transmission, and inheritance of property as native-born citizens”27 while 
“no native of China…shall ever exercise the privileges of an elector in this State.”28 The 1882 
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Chinese Exclusion Act, in addition to prohibiting further immigration, also outlawed the 
naturalization of Chinese immigrants.29   
 In response to legal vulnerability, Chinese immigrants constructed and lived in 
Chinatowns that were organized by Chinese Six Companies for protection. Discriminatory laws 
such as an 1852 Testimony Law made it illegal for Chinese immigrants to testify in courts 
against whites. While we will explore discriminatory legislation as a result of anti-Chinese 
discourse in greater detail, here it is only important to note that Anglo-American violence, 
discourse, and legislation isolated Chinese immigrants from Anglo-American society, who in 
turn pointed to the isolation and ‘clannish’ nature of Chinese immigrants as reasons for 
exclusion. 
 The inability to assimilate was perhaps one of the most frequent arguments against 
Chinese immigration to the United States. Contemporaries suggested that Chinese immigrants 
incapable of assimilating threatened the nation-state. Article 19, Section 4 of the 1879 California 
State Constitution stated that “the presence of foreigners ineligible to become citizens of the 
United States is declared to be dangerous to the well-being of the State, and the Legislature 
should discourage their immigration by all the means within its power.”30 An 1878 pamphlet on 
Chinese immigration concluded that “the safety of our [American] institutions depends on the 
homogeneity, culture, and moral character of our people.”31 The Chinese were unassimilable, 
and therefore a threat to the moral and political institutions of the United States. 
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NATAVISM AND THE KNOW NOTHING PARTY 
Nativists, who believed strongly in the importance of assimilation, were among the 
strongest proponents of exclusion. Rather than simply anti-immigration, nativism in the United 
States might more accurately be described as membership in the dominant ethnic group. 
Nativists might embrace Protestant immigrants while discriminating against native born 
Catholics. As we have already discovered, the dominant ethnic group in the United States has its 
roots, or what sociologists might call an ethnic core, Anglo-American Protestantism born from 
English settler colonies (WASP). 32  
After the War of 1812, approximately 10,000 Europeans immigrated to the United States 
every year. Most of these immigrants were middle-class Protestants who spoke English. Fearful 
of foreign influence (particularly Catholicism) in the United States Government, in 1835 Samuel 
Morse formed the Native American Democratic Association. The platform of the NADA 
included a provision that banned the appointment of foreigners to office, banned the immigration 
of paupers and criminals to the United States, and condemned encroachment by the Catholic 
Church. Short lived, the NADA was replaced in 1841 by the American Republican Party. The 
ARP advocated for a 21-year probationary period before naturalization, restriction of public 
office to native-born citizens, and the reading of the King James Bible in all public schools. At its 
height the ARP had an estimated strength of 110,000 members.33 The ARP too was short lived, 
and gave way to the Native American Party in 1845.  
 Then, between 1845 and 1854, immigration to the United States spiked. Over this nine-
year period approximately 2,900,000 Europeans immigrated to the United States, settling mostly 
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in the New England (cities like Philadelphia, New York, and Boston). Most these immigrants 
were impoverished, unskilled, and Catholic. This influx of immigration, coupled with the demise 
of the Whig Party in the 1850s and the rise of religious and ethnic tension on the East Coast, 
gave birth to the Know Nothing Party. 
 Originally called the Order of the Star-Spangled Banner, the Know Nothing Party was 
founded by Charles B. Allen in New York City, 1850. Membership in the Order of the Star-
Spangled Banner was restricted to native born male protestants 21 years and older. Members 
were required to believe in a Supreme Being, and be committed to placing only native born 
citizens in office. One of the most attractive aspects of the Know Northing Party, as opposed to 
other secret societies, was that membership was free. This allowed the Order to easily enlist and 
maintain membership. Because of its strict secrecy, the Know Nothing Party gained its name as 
members who were asked about the meetings claimed to ‘know nothing’.34 Much of the inner 
workings of the party in its early years remain a mystery, as the Order of the Star-Spangled 
Banner was a strictly secret society. The oath to enter the Order prohibited the secrets of the 
society from being written, and prohibited exposing the name of any Order members or even the 
existence of the Order. By 1854 the membership of the Know Nothing Party was at least 
1,500,000.35  
At its core the Know Nothing Party was a nativist organization much along the lines of 
the nativist organizations that preceded it. The Know Nothings proposed that immigrants should 
not be able to vote for 21 years after settling in the United States, over the course of which time 
they could fully assimilate. They believed only native-born citizens were fit for public office, as 
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only those raised in the United States understood how to operate a republican government. The 
Know Nothing Party also sought to restrict the immigration of paupers and criminals, associating 
immigration with the rise of poverty and increasing crime rates across the United States. Finally, 
Know Nothings advocated for restrictions on the extension of slavery and the consumption of 
alcohol. The Know Nothing Party was steeped in Protestantism, and viewed the immigration 
issue as closely connected to the issue of Catholicism.  
The decline of the Whig Party opened the door to the Know Nothing Party, who turned 
their expanding membership into political clout during the election of 1854. In the 1854 and 
1855 elections, the Know Nothing Party took 51 seats from 17 states in the National House of 
Representatives. These victories included all the seats in Delaware, Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
New Hampshire, Rhode Island and most seats in Kentucky. Although the Know Nothing Party 
gained many of its seats from Northern states, the party also took seats in Texas, Louisiana, 
Georgia, and Alabama.36  
While the clout of the Know Nothing Party is evident in elections for the national 
legislature, the Know Nothings had arguably even greater influence at the state and local level. 
Indeed, Orders across the East Coast endorsed candidates from both the Democratic and Whig 
parties that reflected their values, or if there was no such candidate they nominated their own. 
The process by which Orders endorsed or nominated candidates remains a mystery, and 
frustrated many political candidates who could not quantify the influence of the Know Nothing 
Party until election day.37 
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The established black-white binary, notions of Anglo-conformity, and large scale gold 
rush immigration made California fertile ground for the Know Nothing Party. At its height in 
1854 the Know Nothing Party had several lodges in California, with the earliest and largest 
lodges in San Francisco. The Know Nothings drew their strength from reform elements in both 
the Democratic and Whig parties, in addition to citizens concerned about Mexican immigration 
(Chinese immigration was not yet at its height). The political clout of the Know Nothing Party in 
California was astounding. Two days before the San Francisco election in 1854, the Know 
Nothings nominated Stephen P. Webb (in place of their original candidate, Lucien Hermann, 
who was ousted because of his Roman Catholic background) in the race for mayor. Webb won 
with 43% of the vote in a four-way race. The Know Nothings successfully elected all but three of 
their sponsored electors in San Francisco in the election of 1854. And they did it in a span of 
three months. 
Soon Know Nothing lodges spread from San Francisco to city centers in Sacramento, 
Stockton, and Marysville where they experienced success similar to San Francisco. Newspapers 
in these cities speculated as to the whereabouts of the headquarters, and the locations of the 
secret Know Nothing Meetings. As in San Francisco, the Know Nothing Party revealed their 
candidates only days before the election and experienced unrivaled success. Foreigners largely 
avoided the polls, as Whigs and Democrats failed to field candidates who could the Know 
Nothing machine. In 1854 the Know Nothing Party achieved its goal – they nominated native-
born citizens to public office and minimized the influence of foreign born citizens at the polls. In 
1855 the Know Nothing Party succeeded in electing its entire ticket of state officers including 





However, just like nativist parties before it, the Know Nothing Party was short lived. The 
Know Nothings in California failed to unify as a single party and were outmaneuvered by 
Democrats in appointments to the federal legislature. By the election of 1858 the Know Nothing 
Party had fallen to five seats in the United States House of Representatives, and its political clout 
at the state and local levels waned. The slavery issue split the Know Nothing Party, just as it 
would soon split the United States. Large populations of foreign born citizens actively worked 
against the party, voting against the Know Nothing ticket even as the California Know Nothings 
played down the nativist and anti-Catholic platforms. In California, Know Nothings struggled to 
maintain their reformist platform, leaving many white Californians dissatisfied with the ticket. 
Ethnic and religious tension waned, and with it the appeal of the Know Nothing Party. 
Despite its short appearance, the rise of the Know Northing Party as a nativist movement 
is important to study as setting the stage for the Chinese Exclusion Era. Indeed, the nativist 
rhetoric of the Order of United Americans and the Know Nothing Party would soon reemerge in 
California as Chinse immigrants began arriving in large numbers. The rhetoric perpetuated 
against Mexican and Chinese immigrants did not originate in California, but rather in the rhetoric 
of the nativism prevalent in American culture since the 1830s. 
DISCOURSE OF DISABILITY 
 Thus far we have studied the origins of racist ideology including the black-white binary, 
Anglo-conformity, and nativism in the East. The bridge between ideology and action is 
discourse. Here, we refer to discourse as communication or debate. Between 1850 and 1882, 
Anglo-Americans created a discourse of disability based in racial ideology from the Eastern 
United States to justify discrimination and exclusion of Chinese immigrants. This discourse 





Scholars of disability like Douglas Baynton have called for greater attention to the history 
of disability as justification for the inequality of non-dominant groups such as women, slaves, 
and immigrants in the United States. Like race, disability is a socially constructed concept that 
has no static meaning. While today disability is defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act 
as “a person who has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major 
life activity,”38 in 1828 disability was defined as “want of competent natural or bodily power, 
strength or ability; weakness; impotence…want of competent intellectual power or strength of 
mind; incapacity…want of legal qualifications.”39 The first definition focuses on the ways in 
which a disability impedes life, while the 1828 definition is comparative to the competent, or the 
normal. Disability in the 19th century can be described largely as an effort to define the normal 
body against abnormal or deviant bodies, including and especially non-white bodies. 40 The 1828 
definition of disability refers to competent bodily, intellectual, and legal power as measured 
against the “superior moral virtue, including courage, foresight, and bodily skill, [that] defined 
independent manhood.”41 Women, for instance, were “irrational, emotional, and physically 
weak” compared to the white male body, making them disabled and unfit for full citizenship.42  
Characteristics of disability were also applied to Chinese immigrants. Indeed, Baynton 
suggests that “nonwhite races [especially immigrants] were routinely connected to people with 
disabilities…who were depicted as evolutionary laggards or throwbacks” and goes so far as to 
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suggest that “all social histories have drawn on culturally constructed and socially sanctioned 
notions of disability.” 43 Beginning as early as 1850 Chinese immigrants were associated with 
disability or lack of competent ability all three categories under the 1828 definition – intellect, 
body, and legal rights. These markers of disability justified legislation that allowed Anglo-
Americans to assert control over Chinese bodies and exclude Chinese immigrants from 
citizenship, employment, landownership, and eventually immigration altogether.  
We begin with a discussion of the Chinese body, a discourse of disability evidenced in 
speeches by labor activist Dennis Kearney, leader of the Workingman’s Party in California and 
staunch enemy of Chinese immigrants. In his speeches to laborers in the late 1870s, Kearney 
describes Chinese immigrants as diseased, which he uses to justify exclusion. In Saint Louis for 
example, Kearney referenced Chinese immigrants as “the almond-eyed, long-tailed leprous 
parents of the Pacific coast [my emphasis].”44 In another speech in Boston, Kearney cautioned 
workingmen “not to employ Chinese laundry men. They are filthy; they spit on clothes, and if 
they have any disease it is transmitted to men and women through such washed clothing when 
the body perspires.”45 Disease as a marker of inferiority to the Anglo-American body and 
therefore a disability was written on the Chinese body. Note that Kearney made the connection 
between disease and Chinese business, cautioning laborers against using Chinese laundries. Here 
we see how racial naturalism leads to economic discrimination. Indeed, in 1873 and 1880 
California and the city of San Francisco passed legislation that heavily taxed Chinese laundries 
and controlled their operation.  
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The similarities extend to discussions of the Chinese intelligence. Exclusionists drew on a 
discourse of disability that had traditionally been used to justify slavery in the antebellum 
American South as justification to exclude Chinese immigrants. Historians refer to this type of 
discourse as racial naturalism, which focuses on physiological characteristics of difference.46 
One of the most common justifications for slavery was that African Americans lacked sufficient 
intelligence to participate in society with white Americans.47 Chinese, too, were considered 
incapable of full participation in democracy. Here, again, we see the racialization of Chinese as 
black. 
While contemporaries associated Chinese immigrants with physical and intellectual 
disability in much the same way as African Americans, anti-Chinese discourse that focused on 
the body was unique in that it was gendered. Indeed, gendering of Chinese immigrants was 
rooted in the physical appearance immigrants. Chinese males were physically smaller than 
Anglo-Americans, who suggested that the small stature of Chinese immigrants made them weak 
and feminine. Further, Anglo-Americans often referenced the long braid characteristic of 
Chinese immigrants, calling it a pig-tail, as a sign of femininity. To compound the issue, Chinese 
immigrants typically wore loose clothing that obscured their gender. These physical markers of 
Chinese culture did not conform to the Anglo-American norm, and for that reason were labeled 
as feminine and therefore inferior. 
The earliest evidence of gendering is in novels that depicted Mexican bandits attacking 
weak and indefensible Chinese immigrants. There are even instances where Anglo-American 
males came to the rescue of Chinese males. Susan Johnson suggests that “white women and 
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children – customary candidates for the cultural category of ‘innocent and defenseless’ – were 
few and far between in the [California] diggings, and so Anglos took to assigning Chinese men 
such roles.”48 In the early gold rush years Johnson’s claim has merit, however she fails to take 
her observation to its ultimate conclusion. The gendering of Chinese immigrants as feminine and 
defenseless justified the persecution of another social group – Mexican bandits. In this way, 
gendering the Chinese as feminine helped to established Anglo-American hegemony in 
California. Further, the motivation for gendering Chinese immigrants shifts drastically from 
protection in 1852 to persecution by 1882.  
A trade card distributed by the Missouri Steam 
Washer Company of St. Louis in 1882 highlights 
gendered characteristics typically associated with 
Chinese immigrants.49 In this cartoon, a Chinese 
immigrant is being chased away from San Francisco 
towards China by the Missouri Steam Washer Association. The immigrant is holding a washer in 
the right hand and a bag full of money in the left. This cartoon highlights the customary queue of 
Chinese immigrants, and the loose clothing in the cartoon obscures the gender of the immigrant, 
who appears to be small in stature. A square jaw is the only indication that this Chinese 
immigrant might be male. Just as in Kearney’s speech, here the gendering of Chinese immigrants 
is associated with their work in laundries. While we will explore the significance of this role in a 
moment, for now it is important to note the connection between anti-Chinese discourse and the 
economic role of Chinese immigrants. 
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After the passage of the 1852 Foreign Miners Tax and from a constant fear of physical 
harm, many Chinese immigrants abandoned the mines for other trades that were not typically 
filled by Anglo-Americans. One of the biggest trades was the laundry business. In the 19th 
century United States, laundry was largely considered female work. Before Chinese immigrants 
moved into laundry work, the task was typically performed by Native American and Mexican 
women. By 1870, Chinese male immigrants dominated the laundry business. The 1880 
California census suggests that 75% of the commercial laundries in California were operated by 
Chinese men.50 The large employment of Chinese male immigrants in the laundry business 
further contributed to their gendering.  
Historians have largely failed to address the significance of gendering. Susan Johnson 
calls the process of gendering Chinese immigrants a complicated one while most historians 
ignore it altogether. Yet the gendering of Chinese immigrants is significant for the establishment 
of Anglo-American masculinity, an important piece of Anglo-American hegemony, in 
California. The development of masculinity requires the creation and constant maintenance of 
borders, most importantly a fear of the feminine. In this sense gender becomes a distinct 
boundary between Anglo-Americans and feminine Chinese immigrants that precludes Chinese 
males from integration into Anglo-American society. Johnson notes that beginning in 1853 
stories of white masculinity pervaded California newspapers.51 Indeed, femininity would be used 
as justification to exclude Chinese immigrants. Governor Haight argued that Californians should 
not desire such an “effete” population such as Asiatics.52 The uncertain and fragile masculinity 
of Anglo-Americans caused them to react swiftly and negatively to Chinese immigrants who 
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embodied the feminine. Joan Wang notes that “racist and gendered labor conditions worked to 
keep Chinese…males in a subordinate position in the American economy.”53 
Politicians were more likely to forgo a discussion of racial naturalism for a discussion of 
racial nationalism as justification for discrimination and exclusion. Rather than based in 
physiological characteristics, this discourse was based in the “fundamental importance of cultural 
attributes”.54 Speaking on the immigration of Asians to the United States, then California 
Governor Haight argued that Asians “are confessedly inferior in all high and noble qualities to 
the American and the European…we desire…a population of white men, who will make this 
State their home, bring up families here, and meet the responsibilities and discharge the duties of 
freemen.”55  
Kim Nielsen notes the link between “citizenship rights and competence…by quite 
literally taking away the right to own and manage property from citizens who were deemed 
inadequate.”56 While Nielsen was studying the ways in which property was taken away from 
people who were deemed incompetent, her observations can be applied to the ways in which 
Chinese immigrants were excluded from owning or occupying certain spaces based on a 
discourse of disability. For example, in 1870 San Francisco passed an ordinance that required 
500 cubic feet of air per person in living structures. The Cubic Air Ordinance was passed based 
on a health inspector’s report of Chinatown where he wrote that Chinese immigrants “live 
crowded together in rickety, filthy, and dilapidated tenement houses, like so many cattle or 
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hogs.”57 Here, disability is written on the Chinese body as disease that requires legislation to 
control Chinese living spaces, who like cattle or hogs are incapable or unwilling to maintain their 
own living environments.  
Disability discourse did not end with the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 or the Geary Act 
of 1902 which continued to exclude Chinese immigrants from immigrating to the United States. 
Notably, laws passed in California to restrict Chinese from occupying certain spaces set the 
precedent for future discriminatory legislation that in the 20th century. In 1913 the California 
Alien Land Law prohibited aliens ineligible for citizenship from owning agricultural land. This 
law applied mainly to Japanese immigrants. Between 1913 and 1925 other western states 
including New Mexico, Montana, Idaho, Washington, Oregon, and Utah also passed Alien Land 
Laws targeting Japanese immigrants that restricted land ownership to citizens. While Chinese 
immigrants were not the first to experience discrimination, they were not the last and set the 
precedent for fifty years of immigration policy. 
INSTITUTIONAL HEGEMONY 
 This section takes a closer look at the development of Anglo-American hegemony in 
California as a product of the ideas, norms, and institutions that Anglo-American emigrants 
travelled West to bridge the gap between ideas and action. We have looked at the ideological 
basis for Chinese exclusion, and now we turn to the political origins of exclusion rooted in a 
discourse of difference.  
 A critical aspect of hegemony is political control of the dominant group. And indeed, in 
California between 1848 and 1882 Anglo-Americans acquired and maintained almost sole 
possession of political power. For the first two years of the gold rush (1848-1849), immediately 
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after the Mexican-American War, California was a territory of the United States. While the 
United States Congress debated about the status of California, state leaders took matters into 
their own hands by organizing a constitutional convention in 1849. Of the forty-nine original 
members of the constitutional convention, eight were Californios (early Californians of mixed 
European, African, and Native American origin). One of the most prominent Californios was 
Mariano Guadalupe Vallejo.  
 Vallejo was born sometime between 1807 and 1808 in Monterey, California, as a subject 
of Spain. Vallejo studied under the Governor of Alta California and after the Mexican 
Revolution was appointed as a cadet in the Mexican army. Over the next several decades, 
Vallejo moved up the military ranks and eventually served as the Commander of the Presidio of 
San Francisco where he worked to combated Russian aggression and Native American revolts.  
Despite being a high-ranking official in the Mexican army, Vallejo was highly critical of 
the Mexican government.58 Vallejo viewed the United States as a model form of government, 
and favored a United States rule. During the Bear Flag Revolt, General John Frémont took 
Vallejo into custody and kept him as a prisoner of war at Sutter’s Fort. Despite poor treatment at 
the hands of the Bear Flag rebels and the looting of his estates, Vallejo remained confident in the 
liberating potential of the United States government.59 After the Mexican-American War, Vallejo 
was appointed as Indian agent for Northern California and was part of the California 
constitutional convention. He was even elected to the first state senate. 
Vallejo’s story and his service as a senator in the first California Congress suggests that 
incorporation rather than exclusion was the norm in the earliest years of California. However, 
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Vallejo’s experience during his time as a Senator reveals the beginning of Anglo-American 
hegemony in California. Although the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848) had promised 
citizenship to Mexican males residing in the annexed territory (provided they renounce 
allegiance to the Mexican government), in practice Mexican-Americans did not enjoy the 
protections of citizenship that Anglo-Americans enjoyed. Most Mexican-Americans lost their 
land and position in the newly formed state. Vallejo faced legal challenges to his land and 
fortune in the newly minted state that deprived him of his fortune and virtually all his land. 
Despite his service to the United States, Vallejo died in 1890 on the single ranch he had managed 
to maintain in northern California. 
Vallejo’s story is one of many Californios who were disfranchised by Anglo-Americans 
in the early years of California. Similarly, Native Americans and African Americans were 
categorized as non-citizens. As non-citizens, neither of these groups enjoyed representation in or 
participation in democracy. So, from the very beginning, Anglo-Americans acquired and 
maintained control of the political power in California. Although there was an opportunity and 
indeed a brief realization of a diverse political leadership, this temporary diversity was soon 
replaced by tight control by Anglo-Americans.  
Anglo-Americans used their position of power to create discriminatory legislation that 
targeted racialized populations. The first target was Latin American miners. In its very first 
session, the California Congress passed “An Act for the better regulation of the Mines, and the 
government of Foreign Miners” which mandated the collection of a ‘foreign miners tax’ at a rate 
of $20 per month. Although the act did not target Latin Americans specifically, in practice the 
tax was collected mainly from Chilean and other Latin American miners.60 The act sought to 
                                                 





protect ‘native or natural born’ citizens (native California Indians were excepted) as well as 
miners who might become a citizen under the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo from competition 
with foreign miners. Congressmen believed that foreign miners were sojourners who were not 
interested in the development of California but only taking money back to their home countries. 
The protection of Mexican American miners reflects the still active Californios in Congress.61 
Where violence had driven Latin American miners from the more profitable northern 
mines, the 1850 Foreign Miners Tax served to drive most Latin American miners from 
California altogether.62 After Latin Americans and Mexican Americans had virtually abandoned 
the mines, the only significant group left (Native American and African American population in 
California was relatively minor) were Chinese immigrants. The next thirty years saw a consistent 
stream of anti-Chinese legislation passed by California Congress (see table 1) that served to 
solidify Anglo-American hegemony. While Susan Johnson suggests that the position of Anglo-
Americans in California was secure by 1852, the frequency and content of anti-Chinese 
legislation suggests that Chinese laborers remained to be perceived as a threat to Anglo-
Americans.  
 Anti-Chinese legislation passed between 1850 and 1913 can be divided into three 
categories: legislation that regulated Chinese laborers/business, legislation that regulated the 
Chinese body, and legislation that defined Chinese rights. Legislation that regulated Chinese 
laborers and Chinese businesses initially targeted Chinese miners with a Foreign Miners Tax in 
1852, almost identical to the Foreign Miners Tax that targeted Latin Americans in 1850. The 
biggest difference was that the 1852 Foreign Miners Tax initially only taxed Chinese miners $3 
per month, compared to $20 per month for Latin American miners in the 1850 tax. This initial 
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reduction was a comprise with Anglo-American businessmen who had suffered from the rapid 
departure of Latin American miners from gold camps.  
The steady increase of the tax coupled with violent encounters with Anglo-Americans in 
the dig sites caused Chinese immigrants to move into other occupations in which Anglo-
Americans were scarce. One of the biggest occupations were laundries. As previously noted, by 
1870 nearly 75% of professional laundry services in California were owned by Chinese 
immigrants.63 In response, the California legislature passed several laws that taxed and/or 
restricted Chinese laundry business. For example, in 1873 San Francisco passed a series of 
ordinances that taxed Chinese laundries $2 for a single horse-drawn vehicle, $4 for two horse 
drawn vehicles, and $15 for laundries with more than two horse-drawn vehicles or no horse 
drawn vehicles.64  
 The other occupation that anti-Chinese legislation targeted frequently and specifically 
was Chinese fishermen. Initially, Chinese fishermen were charged a $4 per month license fee, 
followed by a restriction on the size of their fishing nets. By 1893 Chinese fishing nets were 
prohibited altogether in the city of San Francisco.  
 Just as many pieces of legislation attempted to restrict and/or control the Chinese body. 
San Francisco attempted on two different occasions (1879 and 1890) to require Chinese 
immigrants to live outside of the city. One of the most striking pieces of legislation was the 
Queue Ordinance, which required county prisons to shave Chinese prisoners within an inch of 
their scalp. This ordinance targeted the traditional Chinese queue braid, which was a symbol of 
honor. 
                                                 
63 Joan Wang, “Race, Gender, and Laundry Work: The Roles of Chinese Laundrymen and American Women in the 
United States , 1850-1950”. 
64 Ancheta, Angelo, Race, Rights, and the Asian American Experience 2nd Ed. (New Brnswick: Rutgers University 





 The third group of legislation defined Chinese rights under California law as non-
citizens. The first piece of legislation to restrict Chinese rights was not a piece of legislation at 
all, but rather an 1854 California Supreme Court ruling that restricted Chinese immigrants from 
testifying in court against white Americans.65 Precedent for this law was derived from an 1850 
Testimony Law that restricted Native Americans and African Americans from testifying in court 
against white Americans. Other laws denied Chinese children the right to public education, and 
ruled that Chinese immigrants could not receive medical care in city hospitals.  
 California legislators restricted where Chinese immigrants lived, where and how they 
worked, their cultural practices, and their rights as non-citizens ineligible for naturalization. In 
doing so Anglo-Americans consolidated their hegemony through political means.  
Select Pieces of Anti-Chinese Legislation, 1850-191366 
Date Legislation/Description 
1850 Foreign Miners Tax requiring foreign miners to pay $20 per month. In practice, this law 
was applied specifically and almost exclusively to Latin Americans 
1850 Testimony laws restrict Native Americans and African Americans from testifying in court 
against white Americans 
1852 Foreign Miners Tax requires foreign miners who do not ‘desire to become citizens’ to pay 
$3 per month in taxes, a fee that was gradually raised every year until it reached $20 per 
month in 1870 
1852  Fugitive Slave Law  
1854 California Supreme Court rules that Chinese are ineligible to testify in court against whites 
1855 California passes “An Act to discourage the immigration to the state of persons who cannot 
become citizens” to restrict Chinese immigration 
1858 California passes “An Act to prevent the further immigration of Chinese or Mongolians to 
this state” 
1860 Act for the Protection of Fisheries requires Chinese American fishermen to purchase a 
license of $4 per month 
1860 San Francisco denies admission of Chinese children to public school and city hospitals 
1862 California passes “An act to protect free white labor against competition with Chinese 
coolie labor, and to discourage the immigration of Chinese into the state of California” 
levies a tax of $2.50 per month on Chinese immigrants over 18 not engaged in the 
production of tea, rice, coffee, or sugar 
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1870 “Act to prevent kidnapping and importing of Mongolian, Chinese, and Japanese females for 
criminal purposes” restricts the immigration of Chinese women to the United States 
1870 San Francisco prohibits hiring of Chinese on municipal projects 
1870 Sidewalk Ordinance in San Francisco prohibits the carrying of “yeo-ho” or vegetable poles 
slug across the shoulders 
1870 San Francisco ordinance requires 500 feet of cubic air within rooming houses, targeting 
Chinese ghettos 
1873 San Francisco ordinance imposes a fee of $2 for laundries using a horse-drawn vehicle, $4 
for laundries using two horse-drawn vehicles, and $15 for those with more than two 
vehicles or those without 
1873 San Francisco passes a series of ordinances restricting the use of firecrackers and gongs 
1875 Queue Ordinance requires prisons to shear the hair of all convicted Chinese prisoners 
within one inch of the scalp, removing the queue customarily worn by Chinese males 
1875 Law regulates the size of Chinese American shrimping nets 
1879 California state constitution prohibits corporations and municipal works from hiring 
Chinese 
1879 California state constitution authorizes cities to remove Chinese residents to outlying areas 
1880 Fishing Act prohibits Chinese from engaging in fishing business 
1880 “An act to prevent the issuance of licenses to aliens” deprives Chinese of business licenses  
1880 San Francisco passes anti-ironing ordinance, preventing Chinese laundries from operating 
at night 
1882 Chinese Exclusion Act restricts the immigration of Chinese laborers to the United States 
1885 Political Codes Amendment allows for the segregation of Chinese in schools and public 
facilities 
1890 Bingham Ordinance declares that Chinese people cannot work or live in San Francisco 
except in a portion set apart for the Chinese 
1892 Geary Act requires Chinese residents to carry a resident permit and extends the Chinese 
Exclusion Act for another ten years 
1893 Fish and Games Act prohibits use of Chinese nets in fishing 
1906 Anti-miscegenation laws prohibit American women from marrying Mongolians 
1913 Land Laws prohibit the owning or buying of land by aliens ineligible for citizenship 
  
Thus far this section has focused on the legislative development of Anglo-American 
hegemony in California. This story is not complete without a brief discussion of the violence that 
accompanied the establishment of Anglo-American hegemony. Anti-Chinese violence began in 
the mines, where white workers physically assaulted Chinese immigrants who worked near them. 
While initially Anglo-Americans perceived Chinese miners who worked abandoned mines as a 





operations angered Anglo-American miners.67 These miners lashed out with physical violence, 
expelling Chinese miners from mining camps. 
Physical violence caused Chinese immigrants to engage in professions not traditionally 
engaged in by white workers. When anti-Chinese sentiment was at its highest riots were staged 
not only in California but other Western communities. In 1877 a two-day program was waged in 
Chinatown against Chinese immigrants resulted in four deaths and tens of thousands of dollars in 
property damage. In 1880, two days before the national election, an anti-Chinese riot broke out 
in Denver’s Chinatown. In 1885 an anti-Chinese riot in Rock Springs, Wyoming, resulted in the 
death of 28 Chinese immigrants, the destruction of 79 Chinese homes, and thousands of dollars 
in property damage. In an interview with female labor organizer Rose Pesotta, Chih Ling and 
Yung Lee reminded Pesotta of the immediate aftermath of the Chinese Exclusion Act. Chinese 
immigrants, the men recounted, were “robbed, beaten, murdered. Hoodlums shot them down like 
dogs and were immune from punishment…many homes burned, and many deportations.”68  
 Violence often characterized direct interactions between Chinese immigrants and Anglo-
Americans. Many of the stories of violence that became the norm will remain untold, the victims 
lost to history, but could likely fill volumes. This chapter focuses mainly on the legislative 
establishment of Anglo-American hegemony, but we cannot forget the violence that often 
followed legislation and characterized the Chinese immigrant experience.  
CONCLUSION 
 Thus far, my exploration of the development of Anglo-American hegemony and the 
resulting exclusion of Chinese immigrants has virtually neglected a discussion of Chinese 
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immigrants themselves. Indeed, the introduction to this chapter pointed to the lack of primary 
sources from Chinese laborers themselves. 
 Yet we know from judicial records that Chinese immigrants were not passive by-standers 
to exclusion. Indeed, Chinese immigrants actively resisted discrimination. The earliest 
immigrants formed California Chinese Six Companies (Zhonghua Huiguan, named for the six 
districts in mainland China from which immigrants originated) that aided newly arrived 
immigrants by helping them find employment and housing. Chinese Six Companies also actively 
challenged legislation that discriminated against Chinese immigrants and successfully repealed 
most anti-Chinese legislation. Chinese immigrants also organized, and in one case expressed 
outrage when they were compared to African Americans.69 Where Chinese immigrants could not 
resist, they persevered. While the 1850 Foreign Miners Tax was enough to drive Latin 
Americans away from the gold fields in California, Chinese immigrants paid the 1852 Foreign 
Miners Tax and in many cases achieved modest economic success despite the tax. After the 1882 
Chinese Exclusion Act, Chinese immigrants circumnavigated exclusion through a system of 
paper sons and paper daughters and where that failed entered the United States illegally via the 
Canadian and Mexican borders. While Chinese resistance to exclusion is not the focus of this 
research, it is important to recognize that Chinese immigrants were active participants in the 
ongoing discussion of exclusion and inclusion. 
 Yet despite these various forms of resistance - physical, social, economic, and legislative 
– in 1882 Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act, barring Chinese immigrant laborers from 
the United States. The next chapter will explore how the Chinese question became a national 
issue (which makes up the intervening 30 years between this chapter and Chinese Exclusion). 
                                                 





For now, there are two important observations to note. The first is that the ideologies 
underpinning exclusion travelled from East to West, so we should view the Chinese Exclusion 
Era not as an aberration in the course of American history but rather a continuation of existing 
trends. The second important observation is that in the cases of Californios, foreign miners, and 







CHAPTER TWO: NATIONAL AND FOREIGN POLITICS  
“To read the California papers, one would suppose that this [the Chinese question] were the 
grand crisis of the Republic” New York Times, 18791 
 
This chapter places the Chinese Exclusion Era more firmly in a national and then 
international context. While historians have traditionally agreed that local and state immigration 
policy was driven primarily by local movements, both local federal immigration policy was 
influenced by national politics to a much greater extent than historians have recognized. 
Politicians and party organizations at the federal level were less concerned with labor and ethnic 
tension in the West than the next election. A national study of the Chinese Exclusion Era 
highlights the political regionalism that continued to grip the United States long after the Civil 
War and frames the rise of the West as a political entity. Indeed, the Chinese Exclusion Era 
formed a battleground for the post-Civil War debate over states’ rights and federal rights. 
Studying the Chinese Exclusion Era in an international context further complicates the 
narrative by revealing the extent to which foreign policy considerations influenced immigration 
policy in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a topic that has been significantly understudied 
by previous historians. While politicians in the United States used the Chinese question to gain 
political advantage the executive branch was focused on developing friendly relations with 
China, using immigration policy as part of favored nation status to bolster US-China relations. 
POLITICAL REGIONALISM, STATES RIGHTS, AND A DEAF CONGRESS 
 On June 17, 1876, the Republican National Convention nominated Rutherford B. Hayes 
as their presidential candidate. Writing his acceptance speech from his home in Ohio, Hayes 
touched on many of the issues facing the nation. He called for civil service reform and an end to 
                                                 





the spoils system that had plagued the Grant administration. He wrote on the currency issue, 
arguing for the abandonment of paper money and a return to specie payment. He expressed his 
desire to unite the country and aid the South, still recovering from the Civil War.  2 Democratic 
presidential nominee Samuel Tilden’s acceptance speech, though much longer than Garfield’s, 
touched on many of the same issues.3 Notably, neither presidential candidate mentioned anything 
about immigration, the Chinese, or the West. 
 Simply put, the Chinese question was a non-issue in the 1876 national election. While 
both parties included a weak anti-Chinese plank in their 1876 platform, both the Democratic and 
the Republican campaigns largely avoided the issue.  For their part, the federal Congress could 
hardly be bothered by demands from California and the West Coast to limit Chinese 
immigration, ignoring numerous resolutions, legislation, and petitions introduced by the West 
Coast. In 1876 the West remained on the political periphery.  
 By a single electoral vote Congress confirmed Rutherford B. Hayes as the 19th president 
of the United States.4 With 15 electoral votes between them California, Oregon, Nevada, and the 
newest state of the Union, Colorado, had all voted Republican, tipping the election in favor of 
Hayes. Although the West had been a non-factor in previous election years, the election of 1876 
convinced Republicans and Democrats alike of the growing importance of the West in national 
elections. For the federal Congress, that meant taking up the issue of Chinese immigration. 
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For the first half of the 19th century, immigration legislation was virtually absent at the 
federal level. When the federal government did establish its first immigration policy it was to 
encourage, rather than restrict, immigration. In 1864, due to a sharp need for labor to meet the 
demands of a burgeoning manufacturing industry, the federal government passed An act to 
encourage immigration, or more commonly the Contract Labor Act. 5 The Contract Labor Act 
exempted immigrants from military service, did not require naturalization, and even established 
an Emigrant Office to purchase transportation, including railroad tickets, for immigrants in order 
to protect immigrations from fraud and to facilitate immigrants “in the cheapest and most 
expeditious manner to the place of their destination.”6After An act to Encourage Immigration, 
little further legislation regarding immigration was passed at the federal level.  
Unlike the federal government, state legislatures had been passing anti-immigration laws 
in earnest as early as 1850. One of the most common state laws imposed a head tax (typically 
$1.50) on foreigners arriving in the United States. States like Louisiana, New York, and 
California feared that the Contract Labor Law would result in a flood of poor immigrants from 
Europe, and proposed to use the head tax to provide for the large number of immigrants who 
would surely become wards of the state. 
California was particularly notable for its anti-immigration laws. In 1852 California 
passed a $3 Foreign Miners License Tax on non-citizens. In 1855 the state Congress increased 
the tax to $6. In 1862 California passed the Chinese Police Tax which placed another $2.50 tax 
on all Chinese living in the state. Traveling through California, American writer Mark Twain 
noted how “officers come down on him [the Chinaman] once a month with an exorbitant swindle 
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to which the legislature has given the broad, general name of ‘foreign’ mining tax, but what is 
usually inflicted on no foreigners but Chinamen.”7 In 1862 Chinese were barred from testifying 
against a white person in court, and Chinese children were barred from public schools. In 1878 
the legislature passed a law that banned Chinese from owning real estate. California’s 1878-1879 
Constitutional Convention specifically banned future settlement in the state by people ineligible 
for citizenship, and banned corporations and states from employing Chinese laborers.8  
The causes behind anti-immigration legislation in 
California are well documented. Unions ardently opposed 
Chinese immigration because they believed that high levels of 
immigration depressed wages and took jobs from white men. 
Unions would blame Chinese immigrants for the economic 
downtown in California in the 1870s. 9 In addition to labor 
concerns, workingmen argued that the Chinese were morally 
corrosive, and threatened to swallow Anglo-American culture in California.10 Westerners were 
fearful that if given the right to vote the Chinese would take over the West Coast.11  
Ostensibly the states taxed immigrants as compensation for the financial burden of 
maintaining immigrants in need of financial assistance from the state, however on the West 
Coast taxes were used as a tool to discourage immigration. The federal government, on the other 
hand, viewed state taxes on immigration as interfering with the constitutional right of the federal 
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government to regulate international commerce. Indeed, the Supreme Court ruled more than one 
state tax on immigrants as unconstitutional between 1850 and 1875.  
The struggle over immigration policy and taxes reflected an ongoing post-Civil War 
debate about the relationship between the federal government and the state. While the federal 
government had asserted in no uncertain terms during the Civil War that federal rights 
superimposed states’ rights, the nature of those rights were still in flux. Put another way, the 
Supreme Court was still which rights belonged to the states and which rights belonged to the 
federal government. The debate over immigration policy was brought to a head in the Supreme 
Court Cases Henderson v. Mayor of the City of New York (1875) and Chy Lung v. Freeman 
(1875). 
 On June 24, 1875, the steamship Ethiopia arrived at the port of New York where state 
law required the ship’s Captain to pay a head tax of $1.50 per foreign passenger. The Captain of 
the Ethiopia appealed to the court to test the constitutionality of the tax. After hearing arguments, 
the Supreme Court sided in favor of the Captain. Supreme Court Justice James Emott wrote the 
majority opinion, stating that “the laws in question are regulat ions of commerce which a State 
has no power to make.”12 This ruling struck down similar head tax laws in New York, Louisiana, 
and California as unconstitutional.  
On the very same day that the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Captain of the 
steamship Ethiopia, the court also ruled on another immigration case – Chu Lung v. Freeman 
(1875). Upon arriving at a port in San Francisco, Chy Lung and twenty other Chinese women 
were detained in San Francisco because the port authorities believed they were “debauched”. 
While the state had the right to detain foreigners they suspected of prostitution under the 1870 
                                                 





Page Act, Supreme Court Justice Miller argued that statue was in violation of the Constitution 
which reserved the power regulate foreign relations to the federal government. Fearful that 
detaining the women in San Francisco would lead to an international crisis with China, the 
Supreme Court ordered the women released.  
The Constitution itself does not delegate the power of regulating immigration to either 
the state or the federal government. Under the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, any power 
not specifically granted to the federal government falls to the states. The only way the federal 
government could weigh in on the immigration issue was through the commerce clause and the 
foreign relations clause. By invoking the right of the federal government to regulate commerce 
and foreign relations the Supreme Court expanded the preview of the federal government to 
include immigration. The Supreme Court ruling moved immigration from the purview of state 
governments to the federal government, ending the immigration debate between the states and 
the federal government. In this way, the Chinese Exclusion Era was a battleground between the 
states and the federal government, moderated by the Supreme Court. By placing immigration 
policy within the preview of the federal government, immigration policy was affected by other 
factors than state politics. 
Deprived of the head tax, and now constitutionally beholden to the federal government to 
regulate immigration, numerous state legislatures petitioned the 47th Congress to prohibit further 
Chinese immigration.13 In addition to petitions from state legislatures, California members in the 
House and in the Senate continuously introduced legislation to restrict Chinese immigration in 
the national Congress. In 1875, three bills were introduced to alter naturalization laws to exclude 
Mongolians, or Chinese immigrants. In 1876, four more bills were introduced in Congress to 
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modify existing immigration policy, all targeting the Chinese and all introduced by Congressmen 
from California.14 In 1876 the California Legislature sent a resolution to the Senate to modify the 
Burlingame Treaty with China that allowed for free immigration between China and the United 
States. In 1878 five more bills were introduced to restrict Chinese immigration, three of which 
came from California, the other two from Nevada and Alabama respectively. “To read the 
California papers, one would suppose that this [the Chinese question] were the grand crisis of the 
Republic” wrote a New York Times editor.15  
Despite agitation from Western states, almost all the proposed legislation died in 
committee. The greatest action taken by the Senate was to appoint a joint committee of three 
senators to investigate Chinese immigration issue in California. Clearly, the Chinese question 
was not a concern for the national Congress in 1876.  
Indeed, while both the Democratic National Party and Republican National Party had 
introduced immigration planks to their respective party platforms for the presidential election of 
1876, neither plank was particularly strong. The Republican plank called for Congress to ‘fully 
investigate’ the effects of Mongolian immigration on the moral and material interests of the 
country while the Democratic plank called for a modification of the Burlingame Treaty.16 
Neither national platform called for a suspension of Chinese immigration or conveyed a sense of 
urgency. 
The Chinese question may have not received national attention because, as many 
historians have failed to note, the West Coast was not of one mind on the issue. While laborers 
on the West Coast felt threatened by Chinese immigration, land owners, businessmen, and 
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manufacturers viewed Chinese immigrants as a source for cheap labor and for that reason 
encouraged open immigration.17 Farmer William W. Hollister from Santa Barbara, California, 
testified before the Joint Special Committee to Investigate Chinese Immigration: “My own 
conviction is, from my experience in this State for twenty years, that we never have had a 
sufficient amount of reliable, patient, kindly labor. The field or labor is so enormous that I do not 
see when the time will come when it shall be fully filled.”18John Stuart, working for the Pacific 
Mail Steamship Company, testified “…in my opinion [Chinese immigration] will never assume 
proportions that will interfere with the morality of the state to any extent.”19 Mark Twain wrote 
approvingly that “All Chinamen can read, write and cipher with easy facility – pity but all our 
petted voters could.”20 He goes on to note that the Chinese “waste nothing. What is rubbish to a 
Christian, a Chinaman carefully preserves and makes useful in one way or another.”21  
Indeed, these testimonies and the conclusion of Congressman Morton regarding the 
nature of the Chinese stand in direct contrast to working class arguments. Hollister noted the 
shortage of labor in California, while labor unions protested Chinese immigration because 
Chinese workers were willing to work for less than white workers and in doing so undercut white 
working wages. Stuart described Chinese immigrants as morally upstanding, while workingmen 
complained about the moral degradation of the Chinese. The report of the joint committee further 
argues that the Chinese are intellectually inferior, while Twain observes that the majority of 
Chinese are equal to the white man in intellect. Clearly the West Coast was divided over the 
issue of Chinese immigration, with “the laboring men and artisans, perhaps without exception, 
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opposed to the influx of Chinese,” while businessmen and capitalists advocated for open doors.22 
Fracturing the West Coast along class lines, there was not enough consensuses amongst voters to 
make the Chinese question a national issue for the election of 1876.  
The Supreme Court cases Henderson v. Mayor of City of New York (1875) and Chy Lung 
v. Freeman (1875) had placed immigration firmly within the preview of the federal government, 
forever altering exclusion legislation as other considerations began to impact immigration 
legislation. The problem for working class agitators on the West Coast was that Congress felt no 
need to address the Chinese question either through legislation or by modifying existing treaties 
with China. Because California voters were not unanimous, politicians avoided the issue and the 
West remained on the political periphery. Since the admission of Oregon, Nevada, and Colorado 
to the Union in the 1860s, presidential elections had been decided by landslide victories (in favor 
of Republicans), giving Congressmen little cause to pay heed to the needs of the West. Put 
another way, working class demands for exclusion fell on deaf ears in Congress because there 
was no political payoff for exclusion. Indeed, by 1878 the Chinese question clearly remained a 
regional and class issue.23  
THE ELECTION OF 1880 AND THE 
POLITICAL ASCENT OF THE WEST 
The election of 1876 highlighted the 
importance of the West for winning 
elections. The presidential race of 1876 
between Republican Rutherford Hayes and 
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Democrat Samuel Tilden would turn out to be one of the closest in the history of the United 
States with electoral votes contested in Florida, Louisiana, and Oregon. In the end, Congress 
decided the vote. Many Democrats would blame the three electoral votes for Hayes from 
Colorado, the newest state, for their loss.24 With the close election of 1876 in mind, both parties 
began to look toward the West and their votes for the election of 1880. 
Several contemporary newspapers commented on the importance of the West in the 1880 
election. The Daily Arkansas Gazette noted “The importance of the congressional elections that 
take place today, in California in a national point of view, will appear when the possibility is 
considered of the next presidential election going to the house of representatives.”25 Both parties 
feared that the 1880 election would be just as close as the 1876 election, which meant that 
Congress may once again have to choose the next president. Every congressman counted.  
To that end, 1879 saw a more responsive Congress to the demands of the West for 
restricting Chinese immigration. The Milwaukee Sentinel noted that both parties in Congress in 
1879 passed legislation to carry California in the 1880 election.26 The first anti-immigration bill 
to make it out of committee in 1879 was House Resolution 2423, more commonly the Fifteen 
Passenger Bill, introduced by Senator Wren from Nevada. The Fifteen Passengar Bill proposed 
to limit the number of Chinese persons arriving on any vessel to the United States to fifteen. 
After only one hour of debate on January 28 1879, the House of Representatives passed the 
resolution. The Senate took  longer, with debates lasting over three days, before passing the bill.  
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 The debates, however brief, in both the House and the Senate laid the groundwork for the 
1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, echoing arguments both for an against exclusion.  Martin Gold 
summarizes the arguments for Chinese exclusion on behalf of the House Education and Labor 
Committee succinctly: “If incompatible peoples were permitted to occupy the same country, the 
living standards of white labor would diminish and American cultural and political life would 
corrode.”27 The House Education and Labor Committee, based largely on a joint report from 
California, argued that Chinese immigrants were unassimilable and took jobs from white men. 
Compared to black and red races, the committee felt that the Chinese were morally corrosive, 
and in danger of overwhelming Anglo-American culture. 
 Republican Townsend from New York rose to defend the Chinese. He protested that 
Chinese exclusion violated American principles, and was reminicent of the backwards nativist 
Know-Nothing Party of the Antebellum years. He reminded House Representatives that not so 
long ago, nativists on the East Coast had protested Irish immigraiton. He noted that China had 
only recently opened to merchant business, and legislation barring Chinese immigration 
threatened to jepordize the new relationship. Significantly, both major supporters and opposers 
of the bill were Republicans. The Chinese question was dividing the national Republican party. 
 With the question of states rights versus federal rights more or less settled regarding 
immigration, the Passenger Bill became a battle ground between the legislative and the executive 
branch. Before the House took up the Passenger Bill, they assessed their ability to modify an 
exisiting treaty. Indeed, only after consulting with several attorneys general and precedence set 
by the Supreme Court, the House concluded that Congress did have the right to amend foreign 
treaties.28  
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 The Fifteen Passengar Bill passed the House with 155 yeas and 72 nays. Significantly, 
102 Democrats voted yea while only 16 Democrats voted nay. The Democratic party was 
rallying behind the Chinese question, desperate for the West’s electoral votes in the upcoming 
election. The Republican vote was split almost evenly, with 51 yeas and 56 nays. Indeed, the 
Republican vote revealed regional tensions wtihin the party as the majoirty of the nay votes were 
from northern and midwestern states while southern Republicans joined with western 
Republicans to pass the measure. Perhaps the Republican party was not as concerned about the 
West, given that they had won all three western states in the 1876 election. The vote in the 
Senate was much the same – 21 Democrats joined 18 Republicans in approving the bill while 9 
Democrates and 17 Republicans voted the bill down. While the Democratic vote was closer in 
the Senate, the majority of the party lined up behind Chinese exclusion. 
President Hayes, with the support of northern Republicans, vetoed the Fifteen Passenger 
Bill because it violated the Burlingame Treaty between the United States and China. Discussed 
in greater detail later, the reaction to President Hayes' veto reveals from a different angle the still 
regional nature of the Chinese issue. The New York Times wrote: "It is the first time in many 
years that one small section of the Republic has had an almost exclusive interest in a scheme of 
legislation pending in the National Legislature."29 President Hayes noted in his February 28, 
1879 journal entry: "The veto of the anti-Chinese bill is generally approved east of the Rocky 
Mountains, and bitterly denounced west of the mountains. I was burned in effigy in one town!"30  
Less than a week later, at a March 3rd meeting in Redwood City, California, labor rights 
activist Denis Kearney burned another effigy of President Hayes while stumping for the new 
California state constitution. Kearney, speaking to a large crowd, chastised President Hayes for 
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vetoing the bill. "The idea that a fraud of a President, our servant, can veto a bill that these 
Pacific States want! Isn't he a king and a dictator?"31 Western newspapers joined Kearney in 
lambasting the veto. The East was much more sympathetic to the President's veto. One New York 
Times editor called the Fifteen Passenger Bill “absurd” and “indiscriminate”.32 Agreeing with the 
President that the Fifteen Passenger Bill violated the Burlingame Treaty, the New York Times 
argued that “it would be far more reasonable to ascertain the fact before we imperil the privileges 
of Americans in China what may prove a very serious degree.”33  
Regional lines regarding Chinese immigration, West and South versus East, were made 
clear by President Hayes’ veto. Republican leaders, already divided over the Chinese question, 
feared that the President’s veto would cost the party even more votes during a presidential 
election cycle.34 Senator Miller told The New York Times that the veto “cannot prove to be 
anything but injurious to the Republican party” in voters.35 The Chinese question split the party 
along sectional lines, pushing western Republicans to the Democratic ticket with its strong stance 
on anti-immigration. Indeed, if the West joined the South on the Democratic ticket, the 
Republican hold on the presidency would be in danger.36 
As a counterweight to the veto at the behest of President Hayes, Secretary of State Evarts 
appointed Republican James Angell plenipotentiary to China, and tasked him and two other 
commissioners with renegotiating the Burlingame Treaty. Secretary Evarts told the 
commissioners “to take into account sentiment on the Pacific Coast, United States commercial 
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relations with China, American traditions of liberal admission of foreigners, and the opposition 
of certain religious groups to exclusion.”37 Personally, Angell disagreed with efforts to exclude 
the Chinese, but knowing that the sentiments of the Congress had turned against immigration, 
travelled to China to negotiate.  
Two of the three appointed commissioners were Republican. Joining Republican James 
Angell was John F. Swift, a San Francisco Assemblyman in favor of exclusion.  Democrat 
William H. Trescott of South Carolina rounded out the group, and like Angell was skeptical of 
exclusion. Appointing two Republicans to the commission, one of whom was from California 
and the other heading the mission, allowed Republicans to claim full credit for negotiatio ns. 
 Indeed, Republican newspapers on the West Coast printed extensive reports on the 
commission to assure voters of the Republican Party’s commitment to exclusion. The Daily 
Evening Bulletin in San Francisco gave daily updates regarding the commission. On March 14, 
The Daily Evening Bulletin acknowledged the commission to China with approval, printing that 
“The Federal Government has at last taken an Important step toward a correction of the evil” and 
“No man understands the evils which have grown out of Chinese immigration better than John. 
F. Swift.”38 Three months later, on June 14 the Bulletin noted the arrival of Angell to San 
Francisco with his family.39 On June 16 the Bulletin described a reception hosted by the First 
Congregational Church in San Francisco for the commissioners. On June 18, the Bulletin ran 
another story about the commissioner’s upcoming journey. The Bulletin would print frequent 
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updates on the commission’s progress from the day they landed on August 20 th to the ratification 
of the treaty on May 2, 1881. 
To further woo the West, both the Democratic and Republican parties added stronger 
anti-Chinese planks to their party platforms for the 1880 presidential race. The 1880 Republican 
Party platform stated that “the Republican party, regarding the unrestricted immigration of the 
Chinese as a matter of grave concernment…would limit and restrict that immigration.”40 The 
Democratic Party platform was much more pointed: “No more Chinese immigration.”41 The 
Republican Campaign Textbook for the Election of 1880 made it a point to note that the 
Republican Party was the first to recognize the national importance of the Chinese question, “the 
subsequently adopted Democratic plank on the subject being simply a demagogical bid for 
votes.”42 
 The Election of 1880 also saw, for the first time, notable politicians traveling to West to 
campaign. President Hayes, the first sitting president to travel to the West, travelled by train 
through Wyoming and Utah to California to campaign for the Republican candidate James 
Garfield. In his diary, Hayes reflected on some of his goals for his trip to the West: “AS I now 
see it congratulations on the condition and prospects of our Country will almost always be 
appropriate….and warn the people of some evils existing which threaten our future such 
as…racial prejudice.”43 We can assume that the threat of “racial prejudice” President Hayes 
referred to was the Chinese question. The President gave relatively few speeches during his 
Grand Tour of the West, and what few speeches he did give were often short and extolled the 
                                                 
40 The Republican Campaign Textbook for 1880, 185. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Rutherford Hayes, Diary, August 19 1880 and Kristine Deacon, “On the Road with Rutherford B. Hayes: 






character of West. In San Jose California, he declared “there are those who criticize the climate 
of California…I soon discovered that to a healthy man it does not bring cold or chill. It gives him 
energy and life and prepares him for the great work which the people of that city are to do.”44 
This type of ‘campaigning’ was fairly typical for the late 19th century. To preserve the dignity of 
the office, presidents and presidential candidates hardly ever campaigned on their own behalf 
and rarely gave public speeches, apart from official required speeches and letters. Republican 
presidential candidate Garfield campaigned from his own front porch. Nonetheless, the timing of 
President Hayes’ tour of the West suggests that the tour was a political maneuver to gain favor in 
the West. 
 Though he did not campaign, when given the opportunity Garfield also took advantage of 
the Chinese question to bolster support from the West. Garfield’s formal acceptance of the 
Republican nomination devoted a full paragraph to the Chinese question that echoed arguments 
made by labor unions in the West. He argued that the United States should extend “hospitality to 
emigrants who seek our shores for new and happier homes, willing to share the burdens as well 
as the benefits of our society, and intending that their posterity shall become an 
undistinguishable party of our population. The recent movement of the Chinese to our Pacific 
coast partakes but little of the qualities of such an emigration.”45 This statement holds that 
Chinese immigrants were transitory migrants who did not plan to stay permanently in the United 
States nor bear the responsibilities of citizenship. He maintained that Chinese immigrants were 
unassimilable. Significantly for this study, less than one year earlier Garfield had counseled 
Hayes to veto the Fifteen Passenger Bill.46 A House Representative in 1789 perhaps with an eye 
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on the presidency, Garfield himself did not vote on the Fifteen Passenger Bill. Garfield had used 
the Chinese question to his political advantage. 
 The Democrats also sought to utilize the Chinese question to their political advantage. In 
October 1880, twelve days before Election Day, a New York newspaper ironically named Truth 
published a letter allegedly written by Senator Garfield to H. Morey of the Employers Union in 
Massachusetts, advocating for unrestricted Chinese immigration. The so called ‘Morey Letter’ 
set off a firestorm in the national media. Taking advantage of the letter, the Democrats printed 
and posted the letter to store windows across the Pacific Coast. The Republicans quickly proved 
the letter was a forgery, but the damage had been done. Between Hayes’ veto and the Morey 
Letter, and despite the best efforts of Republicans, two of three western states went to Hancock 
in the election of 1880. 
 Political scientists Stephen Skowronek notes that this political scene reflected a post-
Reconstruction “hegemony of party concerns over governmental operations.”47 The late 19th 
century was indeed a period of intense electoral competition, where each presidential race was 
decided by a few electoral votes. “More than ever before, the calculations of those in power were 
wedded to the imperatives of maintaining efficiency in state and local political machines and 
forging a national coalition from these machines for presidential elections.”48 The election of 
1876, the lack of Congressional response to demands for Chinese exclusion in the West, and the 
election of 1880 and sudden Congressional interest in exclusion bear out Skowronek’s 
observation to reveal that politics at the national level played a greater role in forming 
immigration policy than ethnic and labor unrest in California.  
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 Perhaps the least impactful group on immigration policy was the Chinese immigra nts 
themselves. While Chinese immigrants formed community organizations around what came to 
be known as the Six Companies, due to laws making Chinese ineligible for citizenship Chinese 
immigrants were ineligible to vote and ineligible for office. As historian Shih-shan Henry Tsai 
points out, “Although the Six Companies could and did exert tremendous influence among the 
Chinese in America, they were by no means a diplomatic entity through which important 
immigration matters might be negotiated with the United States government.”49 
The Election of 1880 saw the highest voter turnout in American history. Less than 2,000 
popular votes separated Republican candidate James Garfield from Democratic candidate 
Winfield Hancock. The electoral votes were much more decisive, as 
with a sweep of the much more populous North, Garfield won 214 
electoral votes to Hancock’s 155. On July 2nd, 1881 at 9:30am 
President James A. Garfield was shot at a train station in 
Washington D.C. He died approximately three months later, the 
second president in the history of the United States to be 
assassinated. Vice President Chester A. Arthur succeeded President 
Garfield, sworn into office in his New York home on September 20  1881 (Image Three50).  
1878 PASSENGER BILL AND A PRESIDENTIAL VETO 
While presidential candidates were maneuvering for political leverage in the West, then 
President Hayes was looking across the Pacific Ocean toward Asia. The 1858 Treaty of Tienstin 
had established the first formal relationship between the United States and China. Also known as 
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the unequal treaty, the Treaty of Tienstien 
opened Chinese markets to western merchants, 
creating spheres of foreign influence on the east 
coast of China. A few years later, in 1861 
President Abraham Lincoln appointed Anson 
Burlingame as foreign minister to the Chinese 
Empire. Travelling back to the United States 
with a Chinese envoy in 1868, Burlingame renegotiated some of the unequal aspects of the 
Treaty of Tienstin. The 1868 Burlingame Treaty established equal nation status between China 
and the United States. Meant to regulate relations between China and the United States, the 
Burlingame Treaty also regulated immigration between the two nations. Article five of the treaty 
“recognize[d] the inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home and allegia nce, and 
also the mutual advantage of the free migration and emigration of their citizens and subjects 
respectively from the one country to the other.”51 Article six went on to guarantee that “Chinese 
subjects visiting or residing, in the United States shall enjoy the same privileges, immunities, and 
exceptions…as may there be enjoyed by the citizens of subjects of the most favored nation.”52 
The Burlingame Treaty not only guaranteed the right of Chinese citizens to immigrate freely to 
the United States, but the treaty also guaranteed the Chinese living in the United States 
government protections.  
As a reflection of China’s growing importance as a US trading partner, former President 
Grant travelled to China in 1879, visiting many of China’s major cities and meeting Chinese 
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governors in Guangzhou, Tianjin, and Peking (Image Four53). Chinese leaders greeted Grant 
with enthusiasm, treating him to lavish public ceremonies and banquets. President Grant was the 
first western head of state to visit China, and the Chinese government sought to take advantage 
of the opportunity to strengthen the US-China relationship and recruit US aid in halting Japanese 
aggression.54  
While in Tienstin Lu Hung-chang, a local viceroy, attempted to convince Grant to 
arbitrate a dispute between China and Japan over the Ryukyu Islands. He suggested that if the 
United States aided China in its territorial despite with Japan, the Chinese government would be 
willing to negotiate on the immigration issue.55 In Tunjo, President Grant met with Prince Kung 
whom Grant noted was “very strongly inclined to cultivate the most friendly relations with the U 
S.”56 Prince Kung later also asked Grant to arbitrate disputes between Japan and China. President 
Grant’s tour of China, his reception, and the eagerness of Chinese officials to recruit the 
assistance of the United States indicate the growing relationship between the United States and 
China. 
A little over ten years later, to win the West in anticipation of the election of 1880, the 
United States Congress passed the 1879 Passenger Bill which sought to limit Chinese 
immigration to the United States to fifteen passengers per seafaring vessel. Although we have 
briefly studied regional reactions to the bill, the President’s veto of the Passenger Bill warrants 
further study to reveal how international politics impacted immigration legislation in the United 
States. 
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The newly arrived Chinese ministers Ch’en La-pin and Yung Wing adamantly protested 
the Passenger Bill with Secretary of State William Evarts. Secretary Evarts assured the ministers 
that the debates were merely an example of democracy at work, and asked that they not 
communicate to Peking about the bill. The ministers told Evarts that not only were they 
translating the speeches and newspapers into Chinese for the Chinese government, but that they 
could not guess how the bill or the debates would impact the relationship between the United 
States and Chinese governments.57 
President Hayes’ veto of the Passenger Bill reflected the concerns of the ministers. Citing 
both articles five of the Burlingame Treaty which guaranteed free migration, and article six, 
which guaranteed protection of Chinese immigrants, the President, expressed clear concern that 
the Passenger Bill would negatively affect the relatively young relationship with China. He 
argued that national interests took precedent over local interests. Indeed, President Hayes felt 
that “the summary disturbance of our existing treaties with China as greatly more inconvenient to 
much wider and more permanent interests of the country.”58 The President referred specifically 
to the role of the Burlingame Treaty in opening Chinese markets for American merchants.  
More than that, the President was concerned with the honor of the United States. A 
February 3rd entry in President Hayes’ diary acknowledges the suffering of Californians, but 
ultimately concludes that relief for them “can be done…without any violation of the national 
faith, and without any real or substantial departure from our traditional policy on the subject of 
immigration.”59 Indeed, in the few journal entries that President Hayes mentions the Chinese 
question, it is always in the context of the national faith and honor of the United States on an 
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international stage. Having agreed to the terms of the treaty, the President felt that renegotiating 
the treaty was the more appropriate route. 
The President was sympathetic to the perceived plight of Californians. The same diary 
entry reads: “Our countrymen on the Pacific Coast…are entitled to have…our sympathy in this 
matter….We should at once devise appropriate measures to give them assurance of relief.”60 
Privately, Hayes expressed his distaste for Chinese laborers, considering them to be a weaker 
race.61 He did not let his opinion interfere with foreign policy.  
The Veto of the Chinese Immigration Bill was carefully worded, delineating the power of 
the Congress and the power of the President under the Constitution. “The authority of Congress 
to terminate a treaty with a foreign power,” the president wrote, “is as free from controversy 
under our Constitution as is the further proposition that the power of making new treaties or 
modifying existing treaties is not lodged by the Constitution in Congress, but in the President.”62 
While Congress has the power to approve and abrogate treaties with foreign powers, only the 
president had the power to negotiate new treaties or amend existing treaties. The President hit the 
ball back into the court of Congress. 
The 1879 Passenger Bill put at stake foreign relations with China, the balance of power 
between Congress and the President, and the commitment of western voters to the Republican 
ticket. The President, committed to preserving foreign relations, vetoed the bill. In doing so he 
cemented the President’s role over Congress in establishing and abrogating treaties, leaving 
Congress the power only to abrogate treaties. Although the Angell commission went a long way 
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to assuring western voters of Republican commitments to exclusion, Republicans lost seven seats 
in the Senate between 1878 and 1879, three of which were from western states, giving 
Democrats control of the Senate in the 46th Congress between 1879 and 1881.63 Although the 
President vetoed the Passenger Bill after congressional contests had ended in 1878, Republican 
inaction on the Chinese issue played an important part in races in California and Oregon.   
SHIFTING POLITICS: THE 1882 CHINESE EXCLUSION ACT 
Though the election of 1880 had ended, the Angell Commission continued its work in 
China. The Angell Commission arrived to find the Chinese government under attack from all 
sides. While the Chinese Government in Peking was still trying to reassert control over the 
Qinghai and Gansu Muslims in Northern China who had led a two-year rebellion against the 
Qing dynasty, the French began making moves into Vietnam, which China considered within its 
sphere of influence. Seeing an opportunity China’s longtime rival, Japan, occupied the Okinawa 
Islands.64 Facing both domestic and external threats, China was in desperate need of an ally, and 
was willing to negotiate the issue of immigration to get one.65 
 In less than two months of negotiations a new treaty between the Chinese and United 
States government was signed in Peking. What would become known as the Angell Treaty 
consisted of four articles. The first allowed the United States government to “regulate, limit, or 
suspend” the immigration of Chinese to the United States but not prohibit it. Article two allowed 
for “teachers, students, and merchants” in addition to Chinese already residing in the United 
States freedom to travel in and out of the United States. Article three reinforced provisions of the 
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Burlingame Treaty that the United States would protect the civil rights Chinese immigrants and 
article four required the United States government to inform China of any new legislation limited 
Chinese immigration.66 The Angell Treaty was an unqualified success for the American 
diplomats. It would not be enough to appease the West Coast.    
 In no uncertain terms, the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act passed by Congress one year later 
sought to end the immigration of Chinese laborers to the United States. “Whereas, in the opinion 
of the Government of the United States the coming of Chinese laborers to this country endangers 
the good order of certain localities within the territory thereof…the coming of Chinese laborers 
to the United States be….suspended.”67 Support for the Chinese Exclusion Act was bipartisan as 
both parties sought to fulfill promises from the 1880 election.  
 Whereas the Passenger Bill had divided Republicans along regional lines, the election of 
1880 had turned Chinese exclusion into a national issue that both parties had to support to win 
the West. In the House the Chinese Exclusion Act was passed 202 to 37, with only 3 Democrats 
and 34 Republicans opposed. Once again, the Republicans who opposed the bill were 
predominantly from the North, but many more Northern Republicans lined up behind Chinese 
Exclusion than before. In New York, for example, 8 Republicans voted yea while only 7 
Republicans voted nay. In 1879, 12 of 15 Republicans in New York had voted down the 
Passenger Bill.  
 With much of the same reasoning as President Hayes, President Arthur vetoed the 
Chinese Exclusion Act. Like President Hayes, President Arthur believed that the United States 
should consult with China before abrogating their treaty, arguing that “A nation is justified in 
repudiating its treaty obligations only when they are in conflict with great paramount interests. 
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Even then all possible reasonable means for modifying or changing those obligations by mutual 
agreement should be exhausted before resorting to the supreme right of refusal to comply with 
them.”68 Like President Hayes, President Arthur adopted arguments related to the national 
interest of the United States, arguing that “Experience has shown that the trade of the East is the 
key to national wealth and influence.”69 Once again, foreign considerations shaped immigration 
policy in the United States. 
Congress quickly drafted and passed a new exclusion bill that addressed President 
Arthur’s concerns. Despite the protests of Chinese ministers, President Arthur signed the bill into 
law, as Congress had made alterations to meet the President’s demands. In the span of two years 
Congress had built a coalition around Chinese exclusion and passed the first bill in the history of 
the United States to exclude a group of people based on their race. How did this happen? 
 For one, the foreign relations stakes were not as high as they had been in 1879. After 
1879 the Chinese government faced both domestic rebellion and foreign conflict, and sought the 
support of the United States in these conflicts (as we previously noted, China went so far as to 
ask former President Grant to mediate disputes between China and Japan). The treatment of 
Chinese immigrants was far less of a priority as other demands, making China willing to 
sacrifice the immigration issue.  
Additionally, the election of 1880 had pushed both parties to embrace anti-Chinese 
planks in their party platforms, on which both parties sought to deliver. Midterm elections in 
California were scheduled for later that year, and both parties fought for the West to secure 
dominance in the House and the Senate. 
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At the end of his single term in office, President Hayes reflected on his administration in 
a letter to Senator Samuel Rheem. "I found the country in distress and perplexed with difficult 
and dangerous questions," he wrote. "I left the country prosperous and happy, and with the 
money question, the Southern question, the Indian question, the civil service question, the 
Chinese question, and others either settled or in the process of settlement finally and happily."70 
With minimal damage to the party and an international incident with China avoided, Hayes 
considered the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act as a success.  
CONCLUSION: THE GEARY ACT AND BEYOND 
 The 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act prohibited Chinese laborers from immigrating to the 
United States for a period of 10 years. When the Chinese question resurfaced in 1892, Congress 
quickly passed the Geary Act, extending exclusion for another 10 years. In 1892 the political 
stakes remained too high to seriously reopen the question of Chinese exclusion. Politicians were 
not willing to sacrifice votes to the ideals embodied by the Statue of Liberty.  
 The heart, then, of Chinese Exclusion rests in evolution of the Passenger Bill and to a 
lesser extent the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act itself. While the debates in Congress presented 
both sides of the Chinese issue, they were a side-show to larger political machinations at the 
national and international level.  
As the lack of Congressional action on the issue of immigration before 1879 and their 
subsequent embrace of restricting immigration due to the election of 1880 demonstrates, 
Congressmen were guided by their political ambitions to a much larger extent than historians 
have recognized. Indeed, the demands of the West were met in proportion to its political weight.   
Recent historians like Andrew Bacevich and political scientists like Jacob Hacker and Paul 
                                                 





Pierson have reflected on the lack of Congressional response to working class in the modern era. 
This study traces that trend back to the late 19th century.71    
 Foreign policy, while keeping the best interest of the nation more central than national 
politicians, also shaped immigration policy. More than one president, seeking to maintain 
friendly relationships with China and other nations, vetoed anti-immigration legislation. These 
presidential vetoes highlighted the regionalism that gripped the United States long after the Civil 
War. 
 Two of the least impactful groups on immigration policy was the working class on the 
West Coast and the Chinese immigrants. While domestic unrest had a direct impact on local 
politics, at the national level immigration policy was shaped by the needs of the competing 
parties and the needs of foreign policy. This is a significantly different narrative than historians 
have traditionally written about the Chinese Exclusion Era. For their part, the Chinese were not 
allowed to vote. While the Six Companies mobilized as many friends as they could, ultimately 
they had little impact on immigration legislation. 
 The Chinese Exclusion Era at the national level cannot be explained by a simple cause 
and effect relationship. By placing the Chinese Exclusion Era in a national and then international 
context, it becomes clear that the Exclusion Era was a battleground of foreign policy, national 
politics, class, and race. The Chinese immigrants themselves and the workingmen that advocated 
so strongly for exclusion had little say in how the battle ended. The battle was fought, perhaps as 
it has always been fought and always will be fought, by politicians with little concern other than 
the next election.  
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CHAPTER THREE: THE DIVIDE BETWEEN BUSINESS AND LABOR 
Q. – How Many Chinese gamblers are there in this city? 
A. – I don’t know. 
Q. – Is any part of Canton as dirty and filthy as the Chinese part of this town? 
A. – It is about the same. 
Q. - Do you rent houses of prostitution? 
A. – No, sir. 
- Testimony of Lee Ming Hown before the 
California Senate Special Committee, 18781 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1878 the California Senate commissioned a Senate Special Committee to investigate 
the question of Chinese immigration in California. The product of this investigation was the 
1878 Chinese Immigration: Its Social, Moral, and Political Effect. The 302-page report contains 
57 testimonies over three months from police officers and fire marshals, religious leaders, 
businessmen, British citizens, lawyers, and Chinese immigrants. 
This chapter will take an in-depth look at the report published by the California Senate 
Special Committee. While the report states that California unanimously supports Chinese 
exclusion, a closer reading reveals that two groups supported continued Chinese immigration – 
businessmen and religious leaders. Indeed, while businessmen largely agreed with the laboring 
class that Chinamen were morally reprehensible, they nonetheless argued for and actively 
recruited Chinese immigrants to California for access to their cheap labor. The stark class 
division on Chinese immigration in the California Senate report is reflected in another report to 
investigate the Chinese question published by the United States Congress. The Report of the 
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Joint Special Committee to Investigate Chinese Immigration reflects the class division between 
labor and business at the national level.2 
 The late nineteenth century, more than any other period in the United States, saw the 
development of class consciousness, manifested in the rise of labor unions. This section will 
further explore the class divide between laborers and businessmen and the role of Chinese 
immigrants within that divide. Labor unions universally associated Chinese immigrants with 
business, who laborers accused of bringing Chinese contract labors (or coolies) to the United 
States to undercut white wages. Thus, Chinese laborers, with few exceptions, were excluded 
from labor unions and cast as the enemy of the laboring class. Exclusion from labor unions 
restricted the ability of Chinese immigrants to access policy makers. 
 From Mary Coolidge in 1909 to Alexander Saxton in 1970, historians of Chinese 
exclusion have long emphasized the role of labor in the exclusion of Chinese immigrants. 
History has largely ignored those who would have seen Chinese immigration continue, more 
specifically the role that business played in alternatively fueling, preventing, and reducing the 
period of Chinese exclusion on both a regional and national stage. When we emphasize the role 
of business in resisting exclusion policy, the story shifts from a straightforward cause and effect 
relationship between protest and policy to a more complex story where various parties used their 
power to influence policy. 
CALIFORNIA SENATE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AND THE US CONGRESS JOINT 
SPECIAL COMMITTEE 
The California report Chinese Immigration: Its Social, Moral, and Political Effect begins 
with an “Address to the People of the United States” in which the authors describe the effects of 
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the Chinese population upon the ‘social and political condition’ of the state, many effects of 
which will be familiar to readers from our previous discussion on discourse and disability. “All 
must admit that the safety of our institutions depends on the homogeneity, culture, and moral 
character of our people,” the address begins, and goes on to argue: 
The Chinese…remain separate, distinct from, and antagonistic to our people in 
thinking, mode of life, in tastes and principles, and are as far from assimilation as 
when they first arrived. They fail to comprehend our system of government; they 
perform no duties of citizenship…They do not comprehend or appreciate our 
social ideas, and they contribute but little to the support of any of our institutions, 
public or private. They bring no children with them, and there is, therefore, no 
possibility of influencing them. Their moral ideas are wholly distinct from our 
own…Bribery, intimidation, and other methods of baffling judicial action, are 
considered by them as perfectly legitimate.3 
 
The authors argue that the influence of Chinese immigrants on the state of California is negative 
because Chinese immigrants cannot be assimilated by traditional methods (Anglo-conformity), 
and they cannot comprehend or participate in society with Americans. Their moral state is so 
separate from that of Americans that they are a threat to the state of California. The report’s table 
of contents suggests other against Chinese immigration made in the body of the report: 
abandonment of children, sick and helpless, acts of assassination, bribery of public officers, want 
of cleanliness, prostitution, coolie labor, criminal population, diseases, fires in Chinese quarter, 
gambling, lack of honesty, ignorance of, innocent men ruined, infidelity, leprosy among, murder, 
opium consumption, and thieving.4 The report and its contents largely reflects anti-Chinese 
discourse rooted in the establishment of Anglo-American hegemony in California that we 
explored in Chapter One. 
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 While the “Address to the People of the United States on the Evils of Chinese 
Immigration” at the beginning of the report makes it seem like the state of California is united in 
its call for Chinese exclusion, a closer reading of the testimonies within the report tell a different 
story. While laborers, police officers, British traders, and doctors describe Chinese immigrants in 
negative terms, there are two small groups within the report that describe the effect of Chinese 
immigration in positive terms – business owners and clergymen. 
Morgenthau, a wool, candle, and soap manufacturer, argued that Chinese immigrants 
“have been a great advantage to this coast”. The advantages Morgenthau described are primarily 
in the cheapness of their labor. While he admitted white laborers produce higher quality goods, 
he claimed that “If we had to employ only white men, we could not run our factories”5 because 
white labor costs too much. He described the problems he has had with white laborers taking 
long lunches and holidays without notice, a problem he had presumably not experienced with 
Chinese laborers. When pressed by the committee, he admitted that Chinese immigration “will 
affect the country disastrously”, however, he claimed that he could not “see a way out” of 
employing Chinese immigrants.6 
A. Schell, previously a lawyer but at the time of the report a grape, wool, and stock raiser 
began his testimony by claiming that “much of my work would be left undone” if not for 
Chinese immigrants. Like Morgenthau, his testimony focuses on the labor element of Chinese 
immigrants – he argued that “in the country, if the Chinese element of labor was taken away 
from us it would be a great detriment.” He went on to testify, “if you exclude Chinese you will 
have to close up every woolen mill on the coast.”7 Though he admitted, under questioning, that a 
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white man produces superior products to the Chinese man, he cannot depend on the white 
laborer. Indeed, Schell compared Chinese laborers favorably to white laborers. He claimed that 
where the Chinaman will stay on and work, the white laborer will work long enough only to earn 
the money he needs and then leave. He also testifies that he has “never met but one Chinaman 
who could not read and write his own language, and I have met a great many white men that 
could not do it.”8  
We can compare Schell’s testimony with that of a practicing attorney-at-law, D.J. 
Murphy. Murphy described Chinese immigrants as “adroit and expert thieves”, adept at perjury 
and further described their testimony as unreliable unless supported by white testimony.9 
Murphy estimated that seven or eight out of every ten Chinese immigrants were criminals. While 
Murphy had a decidedly negative view of Chinese immigrants, Schell focuses on Chinese labor 
and work ethnic in a positive light. As a previous lawyer, we might guess that Schell encountered 
Chinese immigrants in much the same fashion as Murphy. Yet his change in occupation, from 
lawyer to business owner likely altered his perspective on Chinese immigrants.   
While Schell was in favor of the Chinese primarily for their labor element and had little 
to say about their moral state, he also cast the Chinese question in light of relations with the 
Eastern United States. “The question is,” Schell stated, “whether we should encourage home 
manufactures or send money East for shoddy goods.”10 Morgenthau also cast the Chinese 
question in comparative terms. Upon questioning by Senator Donovan whether goods made East, 
by whites, would be better than goods made in the West by Chinese, Morgenthau (employing an 
understanding of competition and supply and demand) responded that production in the West 
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forces Eastern manufactures to lower their prices. Should Chinese be excluded, Morgenthau 
argued that people would have to pay higher prices for Eastern goods or send abroad for goods, 
which would be “as bad as sending money to China.”11 Businessmen were tapping into a long-
standing concern of the extent to which the West was influenced and, indeed, controlled by the 
Eastern United States. More than profit, the Chinese question was rolled up in East-West 
relations. 
 Businessmen described the advantages of Chinese immigrants largely in terms of their 
cheap labor, and readily admitted that Chinese immigrants undercut white labor. Further, when 
asked, Morgenthau testified that Chinese immigrants live “crowded together in small rooms, on 
filthy alleys. I don’t believe many places that I know have been dry or clean for ten years – never 
clean.”12 While white businessmen appear to harbor the same prejudices against Chinese 
immigrants, the financial benefits for them outweigh the social and moral implications of 
Chinese in California. 
There were a few businessmen who were totally against Chinese immigration. Abram 
Altemeyer, a boot and shoe manufacturer who at times employed between three hundred and five 
hundred Chinese immigrants, was one such businessmen. While the committee seemed primarily 
interested in the method by which Altemeyer contracted Chinese immigrants (with Yu-chuy-lung 
Company, “We made contracts with them to furnish us so many men for a certain price”13) and 
the effect of employing Chinese immigrants on white labor (“there is no question but that 
[Chinese labor] keeps white men from coming here, while those who are here cannot get 
work”14) they also inquired into Chinese immigrants as workers. Altemeyer testified that he had 
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found Chinese immigrants to be dishonest and bear “close watching”, and that they produce 
inferior goods compared to white laborers.  
 Altemeyer went on to testify that his company was in the process of replacing Chinese 
immigrants with white workers, claiming that the initial employment of Chinese immigrants was 
due to labor shortages in California and extravagant wages demanded by members of the Order 
of the Knights of Saint Crispin, an American laborer union who fought the use of machinery and 
unskilled labor. No doubt, rising anti-Chinese sentiment also played a role in Altemeyer’s choice 
to begin employing white laborers. Though the Order of the Knights of Saint Crispin had fallen 
to the wayside by the time of the report, Altemeyer confirmed that his company paid white 
workers ‘double’ the pay of Chinese laborers. The increased pay, however, was offset by the 
higher production and higher quality of white workers.15 Another factor in his decision to 
employee white workers may have been the movement amongst consumers in the West to only 
purchase goods made by white laborers.16 In this way businessmen who employed white laborers 
derived greater profits from consumers who were willing to pay more for white labor. 
There are a few striking additional aspects of the report worth noting. The first is the 
submission of testimony by British merchants and travelers. Of 57 testimonies collected by the 
commission, 5 were by citizens of the British Empire who had travelled to China. The choice of 
British merchants as opposed to American merchants appears odd at first glance. Chinese ports 
had been open to American merchants since 1784, and diplomatic relations with China had been 
established by the Treaty of Wangxia in 1844. So, by the time of the report in 1877, American 
merchants had been trading with China for 103 years. There is no record that specifically 
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indicates the reason why the committee called on British merchants rather than American 
merchants.  
The line of questioning in the report seems to suggest that British merchants were tapped 
because they were actively engaged in carrying Chinese immigrants from China to the United 
States. One of the first questions the committee asked of British Captain R. H. Joy from China to 
California, he responded that he had transported 882 Chinese immigrants on his steamer 
Crocus.17 The testimony of British merchants engaged in transporting Chinese immigrants to the 
United States and questioning merchants like Altemeyer regarding the method by which 
businessmen employ Chinese laborers reflects anxiety regarding the status of Chinese 
immigrants as contract laborers, or coolies. 
The coolie trade, or the transportation of Chinese contract laborers, began in the 1840s as 
a response to labor shortages across the globe, in part a search to replace emancipated slaves of 
the British Empire (the British Parliament passed the Slavery Abolition Act in 1833) and in part 
due to declining indigenous laboring populations in European colonies. American merchants 
engaged in the coolie trade early, and at the height of their participation earned $11 million in 
ticket fees per year.18 In 1862 the United States prohibited the coolie trade with the “An Act to 
prohibit the ‘Coolie Trade’ by American Citizens in American Vessels”, which made the 
transportation of contract laborers punishable by a fine of up to $2,000 (approximately $50,000 
in 2016 dollars).19 The British Parliament never passed such an act and British merchants 
continued to engage in the coolie trade after 1862, explaining why by 1878 the California 
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committee had to rely on British merchants engaged in the transportation of Chinese immigrants 
to the United States rather than American merchants to China. 
The act that prohibited the coolie trade did not apply to “any free and voluntary 
emigration of any Chinese subject.”20 Indeed, despite the fact that Chinese immigrants to the 
United States were not contract laborers, the continued engagement of American merchants in 
the transportation of contract laborers between 1850 and 1862 (mostly to Latin America) made 
American laborers suspicious, and ultimately associate all Chinese immigrants with coolism.21 In 
the first chapter we briefly explored the racialization of Chinese immigrants as black due to the 
perception that, like African Americans, Chinese immigrants were slave (and therefore unfree) 
laborers. This accusation stems from American participation in the coolie trade. 
 Historian Erika Lee points out the ways in which anti-Chinese leaders accused 
businessmen of engaging in a new system of slavery that degraded American labor.22 The 
association of Chinese immigrants with coolism threw Chinese immigrants into the maelstrom of 
slave labor vs free labor, an argument that the United States had attempted to settle with the lives 
of over 620,000 men in the American Civil War between 1861 and 1865. These years also 
marked the height of Chinese immigration to the United States. In associating Chinese 
immigrants with slave labor, labor unions were tapping into a deep wound that few Americans 
were willing to reopen.  
Another aspect of the report worth noting is that in addition to businessmen, clergymen 
largely spoke positively about Chinese immigration. Reverend Otis Gibson noted that most 
Chinese immigrants (except women) come to the United States as free, not as slaves. The 
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committee returned to this question more than once over the course of his testimony, and in 
every instance Gibson confirmed that Chinese immigrants come of their own free will. When 
describing Chinese immigrants, he disavowed many of the claims made by anti-Chinese leaders. 
He testified that that slavery did not exist in China, and downplayed the influence of Chinese Six 
Companies and the prevalence of gambling in Chinatown. While he admitted that Chinese 
immigrants to the United States were the ‘lowest class of people’, he noted that they were as 
sincere in their intentions as any other people. He viewed Chinese immigrants as an opportunity 
to proselytize and lift them from their debased state.23  
The stance of religious leaders across the United States was made apparent in the 
introduction, when the committee stated that the “Congregational Church of this State has, in an 
authoritative manner, given to the world the opinion of its large and respectable membership 
upon the subject by a church organization, and one that will go far to dissipate an erroneous 
impression that exists in religious circles in the East”.24 The erroneous impression, presumably, 
was their pro-Chinese stance. We largely leave the discussion of the opinion of the religious 
community on Chinese immigration here, simply noting that businessmen were not the only 
group that viewed aspects of Chinese immigrants and immigration as an opportunity.25  
 The California Senate Committee report, its essays and conclusions, came down 
decidedly against Chinese immigration. Before we accept its conclusions as representative of the 
people of California that the report claimed to represent, let us briefly consider the committee 
and the line of questioning. Four of the committee members were from San Francisco, and one 
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from Sacramento, Tehama, and San Joaquin respectively. All seven of the committee members 
were emigrants to the state of California; Haymond was from Virginia, Evans from Texas, 
Donovan and McCoppin were from Ireland. At least four of the committee members were 
previously employed by a railroad company or in the mining industry. All seven committee 
members were Anglo-American. 
 Their backgrounds as Anglo-Americans and their previous experiences working in the 
mining and railroad industry would have almost certainly influenced their collective 
investigation into the “social, moral, and political effects” of Chinese immigration, likely 
predisposing the committee to exclusion. Indeed, the previous chapter investigated the ideologies 
that underpinned the establishment of Anglo-American hegemony in California. Further, by the 
time of the investigation in 1878, popular opinion in California was against Chinese immigration 
especially in the laboring classes that included miners and railroad workers.  
 A close reading of the committee’s line of questioning reveals their exclusion agenda. 
The committee often led the witnesses. Questioning George Duffield, Senator Haymond asked 
“Taking the Chinese quarter as a whole, is it as filthy as it can be?” Duffield replied in the 
affirmative. Haymond went on to ask “How is this population as to criminal propensities?” 
Duffield replied that the Chinese were a nation of thieves. 26 The committee also inquired into 
specific examples of negative Chinese influence. When interviewing John L. Durkee, San 
Francisco Fire Marshal, the committee inquired into “a particular instance – the building leased 
to the Chinese by the Rev. Otis Gibson…Have you had any trouble there?” The Fire Marshal 
replied in the affirmative.27 The committee did not ask Duffield or Durkee about their 
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experiences with honest Chinese immigrants, or areas of Chinatown that conformed to fire 
codes. Without prompting by the committee, the officials did not have the opportunity to submit 
testimony against exclusion. 
 When witnesses, such as businessmen or clergymen, spoke positively about Chinese 
immigration, committee members attempted to lead them toward exclusion. Upon a negative 
testimony of Anglo-American boys and girls working in manufacturing and a positive report of 
Chinese immigrants in their place by Mr. Morgenthau, Mr. Pierson asked (we can imagine with 
some frustration) “Don’t the Chinese fill the places in the lighter employments usually filled by 
boys and girls – and is not that a cause of hoodlumism?” Morgenthau replied that he did not 
know, but if it was it was their [boys and girls] fault. Pierson went on “Don’t you think it is bad 
to have a class of immigration into any country, where they come for the purpose of acquiring a 
little money, bringing no families, and never buying land?” Morgenthau replied that though 
Chinese laborers send money to China, they nonetheless consume American produce and 
manufactured goods.28 
 Though we can imagine, there is no evidence about the attitude of the witnesses or the 
committee members, nor written evidence from the committee members themselves that could 
more definitively indicate bias one way or the other. The report nonetheless indicates that the 
committee was predisposed toward the exclusion of Chinese immigrants. This is an important 
aspect to explore, because the biased questioning of the committee largely clouded the opinions 
of those who might have disagreed with exclusion like businessmen and religious leaders. The 
committee was searching for evidence to fit their pre-disposed beliefs. 
                                                 





  These patterns are reflected in a national study of the Chinese question conducted a year 
after the California report, titled the Report of the Joint Special Committee to Investigate Chinese 
Immigration. This Special Committee, comprised of members of both houses of the United 
States Congress, was tasked to “investigate the character, extent, and effect of Chinese 
immigration to this country…and to report at the next session of Congress.”29 In addition to the 
testimony taken by the California committee, the Special Committee collected the testimony of 
130 additional witnesses. These witnesses include members of the health department, police 
department, criminal judges, statistics on commerce, merchants, bankers, manufacturers, 
Chinamen, physicals, officers of the Six companies, and missionaries.30  
Like the California report, the Congressional report began with an essay. At the outset, 
the essay written by Senator Aaron Sargent of the Joint Committee appears sympathetic to 
Chinese immigration. Sargent began with an observation that “so far as the material prosperity is 
concerned, it cannot be doubted that the Pacific coast has been a great gainer. This is true, at any 
rate, of the capitalist classes.”31 Sargent noted not only the testimony in favor of Chinese 
immigration by businessmen, but also by religious leaders who sought to Christianize Chinese 
immigrants. From that point on, the essay resembles “An Address to the People of the United 
States upon the Evils of Chinese Immigration” from the California report. Sargent wrote “the 
committee found that laboring men and artisans, perhaps without exception, were opposed to the 
influx of Chinese, on the ground that hard experience had shown that they are thereby thrown out 
of employment, and the means of decent livelihood are more difficult of acquisition.”32 He 
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predicted that effect of Chinese immigration on wages would eventually reduce white working 
people to the servile class. He went on to argue that Chinese immigrants have “no love and 
appreciation for our institutions”, a critical requirement of a functioning republic, and that 
Chinese immigrants were “an indigestible mass in the community, distinct in language, pagan in 
religion, inferior in mental and moral qualities, and peculiarities, is an undesirable element in the 
republic.”33 
Just as in the testimony taken by the California Committee, in the testimony taken by the 
Special Committee there is clear divide between government officials and laborers on the one 
hand and business owners and religious leaders on the other. Mr. Pixely, a representative of the 
municipality of San Francisco, testified that Chinese immigrants were an “alien, 
indistinguishable mob of barbarians, whom…rob our laborers of their earnings…our 
manufactories can only find healthful development by the employment of white labor.”34 Mr. 
Henry J. Humphrey’s, a day laborer, testified “I think my branch of business [sewing] is the 
worse imposed on business [by Chinese immigrants]…People who have families are obliged to 
support them, or obliged to almost commit suicide…I know of people living on a crust of 
bread…They are willing to earn their living if they can get work.”35 Humphrey blamed white 
unemployment on Chinese immigrants.  
As in the California report, most business owners and religious leaders were pro-Chinese 
immigration. Mr. Clinton Hastings, a farmer, religious leader, and previous chief-justice on the 
California Supreme Court, testified that California could not get along without Chinese 
immigrants. The committee asked if Mr. Hastings is in favor of cheap labor, and he responded in 
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the affirmative. Hastings testified that Chinese immigration was more desirable than other types 
of immigration, and even suggested that the influx of European immigrants has damaged the 
institutions of the United States as much as Chinese immigration. He testified “the whites are 
begging, and the Chinamen are not; the Chinamen make their living by work, and the white men 
drink whiskey, they do not make a living. I believe in doing all men of all nations justice.”36 In 
addition to lauding Chinese immigrants for their work ethic, he went on to testify that “the 
providence of God is to enlighten and Christianize China through our people.”37 
 Senator Sargent from California authored the essay so vehemently against Chinese 
immigration, who was staunchly opposed to Chinese immigration. While Sargent’s report 
reflected most the committee, there were two members from Eastern states who petitioned 
Congress to allow them to write a minority opinion: Senator Meade from New York and Senator 
Morton from Indiana (who was also the chair of the committee).38 Congress granted Morton 
permission, but before he could finish his opinion the Senator suffered a stroke and died. The 
report was published without a minority opinion (Meade gave a speech on the Senate floor rather 
than write an opinion). In 1878, however, his uncompleted report appeared in the Congressional 
Record. It paints a very different picture of Chinese immigration.  
 Morton began with a consideration of the foundations of the United States government in 
equality and the national rights of men and argues that the United States has always been an 
asylum of the oppressed and the unfortunate, open to immigration from all over the world. “Our 
greatest, our only absolute security,” he wrote, “consists in the devotion of the masses of the 
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people to the doctrines upon which the government was founded.”39 He recognized that the 
government had the right to create safeguards against the immigration of criminals, paupers, and 
disease, but argued that exclusion was completely inimical to the foundations of the United 
States. Then he addressed Chinese immigration directly:   
In California the antipathy to the Mongolian race is equal to that which was formerly 
entertained in the older States against the negro…if the Chinese in California were white 
people, being in all other respects what they are, I do not believe that the complains and 
warfare made against them would have existed to any considerable extent. Their 
difference in color, dress, manners, and religion have, in my judgement, more to do with 
this hostility than their alleged vices or any actual injury to the white people of 
California.40 
 
 The New York Times picked up the story of the publication of the minority report, and 
took the opportunity to eschew the California Committee. Senator Morton “was wont to consider 
all such topics from a national rather than a local point of view. On the other hand, the politicians 
who represent California in Congress cannot possibly avoid being biased in judgment by the 
passions and prejudices of their constituents…it is not in human nature for men who want to be 
Senators and Representatives to fly in the face of average public opinion.”41 Both Morton and 
The New York Times hit on different parts of the Chinese question. Morton emphasized the role 
of race in the movement to exclude Chinese immigrants (chapter one). The New York Times 
emphasized the role of politics in the Chinese question (chapter two).   
Morton’s minority opinion stands in juxtaposition to the majority of the opinion of the 
committee, embodying both sides of the Chinese question. National trends as evidence in the 
Special Committee report reflected trends in California – capitalists and religious leaders wanted 
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Chinese immigration to continue, while laborers demanded exclusion. More than in testimony, 
historians have noted the ways in which businessmen in the East sought to utilize Chinese 
immigrants as strike breakers and as a cheap replacement for recently freed African American 
slaves in the South.42  
 A final example serves to drive the point home. A speech by labor activist Dennis 
Kearney (who we also met in the first chapter) highlights the class warfare happening within the 
Chinese question. “The workingmen of California are becoming overpressed,” he told a crowd in 
Boston,  
the capitalistic their and land pirate of California, instead of employing the poor 
white man of that beautiful and golden state, send across to Asia, the oldest 
despotism on earth, and there contracting with a band of leprous Chinese pirates, 
brought them to California, and now uses them as a knife to cut the throats of 
honest laboring men in that State.43 
 
Kearney’s imagery is dramatic (no doubt taking his audience, comprised mainly of the 
laboring classes, into account) – he described Asia as “despotic” and California as 
“beautiful and golden”. Chinese immigrants were “leprous pirates” while white 
workingmen were “honest”. More importantly for our purposes is that Kearney identified 
capitalists – “thieves” and “land pirates” – as the agents that brought Chinese immigrants 
to California to undercut the white workingman. Indeed, Kearney ascribed very little 
agency to the Chinese immigrants. Rather, in Kearney’s opinion, the capitalist was to 
blame.  
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 Indeed, across four of his speeches across Massachusetts, Kearney only directly 
references the Chinese in California 10 times. Much more frequently Kearney talked 
about ‘pool your issues’ for voting purposes (23 times), newspapers (42 times) as the 
voice of capitalists, and directly referenced capitalists as thieves (18 times).44 His 
speeches were focused on a much larger extent on capitalists as agents of Chinese 
immigration than Chinese immigrants themselves. 
 We must remember that Kearney was speaking to laborers in Boston, on the East 
Coast of the United States and perhaps one of the farthest states removed from Chinese 
immigration. A gifted orator, Kearney no doubt had his audience in mind giving these 
speeches. Nonetheless, even so far removed from California we see Kearney connecting 
the Chinese question directly to issues of class.  
 The report by the California Committee and the report by the Special Committee 
both obscure the divide between business and labor over the Chinese question in their 
respective introductory essays that a closer reading makes apparent. The reality of 
exclusion was much more complex. Before we can extract meaning from this 
observation, there is one more piece of the puzzle that needs to be explored. 
THE RISE OF CLASS CONCIOUSNESS, LABOR UNIONS, AND EXCLUSION 
Gregory Mantsios argues that Americans tend to avoid using language based on 
class. “We don’t speak about class privileges, or class oppression, or the class nature of 
society…we shrink from using words that classify along economic lines or that point to 
class distinctions.”45 Historians have long noted the distinct lack of class consciousness in 
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the United States compared to Europe.46 The closest that the United States has ever come 
to a collective class consciousness was in the labor unions of the nineteenth century.  
 The first chapter explored the rise and national influence, however brief, of the 
Know Nothing Party and the ways in which the core tenets of the Know Nothings – 
including nativism and anti-immigration – travelled West with emigrants. While the 
Know Nothing Party was short lived, other national labor unions like the National Labor 
Union, the Knights of Labor, and the American Federation of Labor enjoyed widespread 
support and membership in the 1880s by both skilled and unskilled labors. Widely 
speaking, the labor unions of the late 19th century utilized collective bargaining to fight 
for the rights of workingmen such as better working conditions on factory floors, an 
eight-hour work day, and a graduated income tax. 
 Business responded in kind. As labor historian Kim Voss points out, “…economic 
concentration gave employers both the ability to enforce internal discipline within their 
ranks and the strategic leverage to hold out against their employees…thus, they were able 
to crush broad based unionism.”47 Voss explains the failure of labor unions as a product 
of the mobilization of business against labor unions and the tacit support of the federal 
government. 
 The battle between labor unions and business sometimes turned violent. In 1886 
at a labor protest in Chicago’s Haymarket Square, a bomb went off that killed several 
police officers. The subsequent investigation that identified eight anarchists as the 
perpetrators behind the riot garnered national attention. Four of the identified culprits 
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were hanged. In 1892, the Homestead Strike between laborers and the Carnegie Steel 
Company ended in a gun fight that killed several men on both sides. The governor of 
Pennsylvania called out the state militia and ended the strike. 
 Chinese immigrants in the nineteenth century found themselves caught in the 
battle between laborers and business, at a period when the battle was at its most pitched. 
This was an opportunity for Chinese immigrants to join causes with the white 
workingman, and perhaps move toward a voice large enough to influence policy makers. 
Chinese immigrants were never given the opportunity. Some unions, like the American 
Federation of Labor, were exclusionist and only accepted white, skilled laborers.48 Other 
unions, like the Knights of Labor accepted both skilled and unskilled laborers, women, 
and minorities into their ranks. Even the Knights of Labor, however, excluded Chinese 
immigrants from joining their ranks and even actively protested Chinese immigration. In 
1882, the Knights of Labor joined a protest of 30,000 in San Francisco demanding the 
exclusion of Chinese immigrants.49 
 A few examples of attempts to organize and/or incorporate Chinese immigrants 
exist in the historical record. Indeed, Eastern unions were far more likely to attempt to 
organize Chinese laborers than their Western counterparts. The 1880s the Knights of 
Labor of in New York, strongly convinced of the Knight’s tenet of Universal 
Brotherhood, organized nearly 500 Chinese laborers. Upon vigorous protests from its 
Western members, the New York Knights of Labor dissolved the Chinese assemblies but 
incorporated Chinese members into existing mixed assemblies.50 In 1870, Irish 
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immigrants attempted to organize a Chinese branch of the Knights of Saint Crispin, 
largely to end the Chinese role as strike breakers.51       
These fringe attempts to organize Chinese laborers in the best cases succeeded but 
did not last long enough to be impactful, or in the worse cases completely failed. In 
October of 1887, the New York delegation of the Knights of Labor introduced a 
resolution to intentionally and actively incorporate Chinese immigrants into the union, 
but the measure was defeated 95 to 42.52 Though the New York order continued to recruit 
Chinese immigrants into its existing orders, the dissolution of the Knights of Labor in the 
1890s left little time for Chinese immigrants to build lasting bridges with other laborers. 
The Irish effort to incorporate Chinese immigrants into the Knights of Saint Crispin was 
unsuccessful, and after the strike the Knights took an anti-Chinese stance.  
The organization of Chinese immigrants on a large scale failed for several 
reasons. Voss convincingly argues using statistical evidence that the development of class 
solidarity depends on shared experiences in the workplace and the concentration of 
laborers in working class neighborhoods.53 The very spatial organization of Chinese 
immigrants – who ran their own business rather than working in white factories and who 
lived in self-segregated neighborhoods – precluded their incorporation into labor 
unions.54 Perhaps more importantly, and something we have already discussed, are the 
ways in which Chinese immigration was perceived by laborers as connected to business. 
Indeed, the participation of American merchants in the ‘coolie trade’ connected Chinese 
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immigrants to unfree labor as early as the 1840s. In this way, Chinese immigrants were 
cast on the side of business before free Chinese immigrants began arriving in the United 
States in the 1850s. This, at a time when the division between labor and business was at 
its height.  
Unions that attempted to incorporate Chinese immigrants into their ranks to gain 
bargaining power and further their cause. Thomas Maguire of the New York Knights of 
Labor felt that organizing Chinese laborers was critical for stabilizing the wagers of all 
workers.55 The Knights of Saint Crispin wanted to organize Chinese laborers to end their 
role as strikebreakers. Even here, we see Chinese immigrants being incorporated and/or 
excluded from unions to further the ends of the union leaders. Some unions attempted to 
attract Chinese immigrants to further their own cause.  
THE POWER OF POLICY 
 The relationship between capitalism, democracy, and race continues to engage 
academics. Deanna Koepke suggests that “the wealthy elite use the power they wield 
through democracy and capitalism to gain more of the valuable resources available and 
then do whatever it takes to keep those resources and stay in power.”56 In the United 
States, the wealthy elite in both politics and business have traditionally been white. 
Indeed, the first chapter explored the ways in which Anglo-Americans established 
hegemony through policy. This was only possible after removing Californios from 
political power. Chapter two argued that politicians nationalized the Chinese question 
only after California became a state in 1850, earning the right to vote. Both chapters 
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emphasized the role of policy makers and the institution of democracy as vehicles for the 
establishment of Anglo-American hegemony in the West.  
 Similarly, businessmen sought to maintain access to the cheap labor of Chinese 
immigrants by influencing policy on both a regional and national level. In California, the 
1850 Foreign Miner’s Tax of $20 targeting Latin American miners had left businesses in 
the southern part of California without customers. When another foreign miner’s tax was 
introduced in 1852, businessmen successfully petitioned a reduction in the amount of the 
tax from $20/month to $5/month. Where the 1850 Foreign Miner’s Tax virtually rid 
California of Latin Americans, the reduced 1852 Foreign Miner’s Tax allowed Chinese 
immigrants to remain in California and in many cases, financially prosper. Business 
owners also resisted Chinese exclusion on the national level. The original 1882 Chinese 
Exclusion Act demanded the exclusion of Chinese immigrants for 20 years. Business, in 
conjunction with the executive branch, successfully petitioned a reduction in the length of 
exclusion from 20 years to 10 years.  
Business, however, was not quite the champion Chinese immigrants needed. 
Kopeke goes on to suggest that “victims of racism are often exploited for their labor or 
property, excluded from participating in public life, and subjected to physical violence.”57 
Businessmen were at once interested in perpetuating racism and continued immigration. 
Indeed, there are no cases of business resisting types of discriminatory legislation that 
were unrelated to their access to cheap labor such as the San Francisco Queue Ordinance, 
or the issue of naturalization. Rather, business stood by and profited from the continued 
discrimination against Chinese immigrants in California and the larger United States. 
                                                 






 While business owners did not have enough policy making power to halt policies 
that prevented Chinese immigrants from immigrating, their impact on reducing the 
severity of exclusion should not be overlooked. Indeed, a closer look into the rift between 
labor and business over the Chinese question and the ways in which business successfully 
reduced Chinese exclusion reveals that the issue of exclusion was much more complex 
than a simple cause-and-effect relationship between labor protests and policy. Rather, 
different groups with varying amounts of power fought sought to manipulate the Chinese 
question to further their own interests. In the end, the power of exclusionists outweighed 






In 1909, Mary Coolidge wrote the first study of the Chinese Exclusion Era, 
Chinese Immigration.1 Over one hundred years later, this study contends that work in this 
field is not complete. While historians have traditionally studied the Chinese Exclusion 
Era as a bottom-up phenomenon, one of the most significant contributions of this work to 
the field of immigration history is its top-down focus on institutions and the ways in 
which people in power or with access to power shaped the Chinese Exclusion Era. This 
top-down approach reveals that the evolution of the Chinese Exclusion Era was not a 
direct cause-and-effect relationship between labor and policy, but rather a complex 
negotiation between groups with various amounts of power. Anglo-Americans used the 
Chinese question to establish hegemony in the West. Politicians used the Chinese 
question to win local and national elections and as a foreign policy tool. Businessmen and 
laborers alike used the Chinese question to gain the upper hand in class conflicts.  
The top-down focus also sheds lights on the ways in which institutions privilege 
certain groups over others. Anglo-Americans worked within the democratic system to 
pass discriminatory anti-Chinese legislation in California. At various times these laws 
prohibited Chinese immigrants from naturalization, citizenship, land ownership, the right 
to testify in court, and the right to vote. Indeed, one scholar has suggested that 
discrimination has historically been a governmental requirement.2 The use of the 
democratic system to discriminate against immigrants continues to this day. 
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Further, while the study of the Chinese Exclusion Era has been relatively stagnant 
in the past decade, with only a few historians like Erika Lee still actively studying this 
period, this study reveals that there is a significant amount of work that still needs to be 
done. Indeed, this study is one of the first to seriously consider the implications of the 
ways in which Chinese immigrants were gendered as feminine, and the first to apply 
disability theory to Chinese immigration. Chinese immigrants as feminine adds depth to 
the role of xenophobia beyond just race. Further, the application of disability theory 
reveals the ways in which disability has been used two discrimination against immigrant 
groups throughout the history of the United States. Reaching out to the scholars and 
methodology of other disciplines such as Ethnic Studies, Digital Humanities, and 
Economics offers historians the opportunity to look at a period or a topic that has 
ostensibly been exhausted in new, fresh, meaningful ways.  
For the study of immigration is as critical now as it has ever been. Today, immigration 
issues continue to be manipulated by those in power to further their own interests. During the 
2016 Republican race, candidate Donald Trump promised to secure the southern border of the 
United States by constructing a physical wall and increasing the number of border patrol agents 
to prevent the immigration of Mexicans to the United States.3 The middle class uses anti-
immigration to  preserve a social hierarchy where citizens of the United States are superior to 
immigrants or non-citizens, partly as a reaction to the ways in which the middle class is 
discriminated against by the professional class.4 On the other side of the coin, farmers exploit 
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cheap Mexican labor, paying aliens inferior wages because of their status as ‘illegal’. The 
democratic system continues to streamline discriminatory legislation against non-citizens.  
This study suggests that individual racism and the discontentment of the lower and 
middle classes are not the driving forces behind legislation that discriminates against immigrants. 
Rather, politicians and businessmen exploit immigration issues to further their own interests. 
Therefore, when we look at immigration reform we should look not to the public, but rather at 
democratic and capitalist institutions that allow and even reward discriminatory behavior. If 
information is power, then perhaps this revelation will encourage self-reflection on the ways in 
which certain groups are marginalized and certain groups are privileged, and perhaps this 
reflection will promote change in how we address immigration. Perhaps one day the words 
written in 1883 by Emma Lazarus, that grace the Statue of Liberty’s pedestal, will be finally 
come true -  
"A might woman with a torch, whose flame Is the imprisoned lightning, and her name Mother of 
Exiles. From her beacon-hand Glows world-welcome” 
       
- The New Colossus by Emma Lazarus, 1883 
 
 
